The Thucydidean Turn starts with the Thucydides trap—Graham Allison’s recent attempt to conceptualise the relations between China and the US through Thucydides’ analysis of how the fear engendered in Sparta by Athenian growth ‘made war inevitable’. Earley (henceforth E.) then turns back from the ‘trap’—which he claims has ‘given greater public prominence to Thucydides than the Greek historian has ever enjoyed in the past’ (1)—to analyse an earlier period of scholarly interest in Thucydides. In the rest of the book, he explores readings of Thucydides’ political thought in Great Britain in the first half of the twentieth century—Britain being, he suggests, the country where the influence exerted by contemporary events (the Boer War, the First World War) on Thucydidean scholarship was greatest. E.’s overarching argument is that these readings form a neglected background to the disciplinary formation of International Relations in the United States in the second half of the century. This argument is supported by successive chapters devoted to five figures, two of them (F. M. Cornford, G. F. Abbott) authors of monographs on Thucydides, the other three (Alfred Zimmern, Arnold Toynbee, Enoch Powell) famous above all for their (in one case notorious) contributions beyond the discipline of Classics; in addition, each chapter is enriched by a cast of supporting scholars (for instance, T. R. Glover and Charles Cochrane) from E.’s main time period as well as by prospective overviews of how themes have been developed in more recent scholarship in both Classics and Political Science.

E.’s book marks the latest stage in the Thucydidean turn in reception studies, following as it does in the wake of a number of recent edited volumes and monographs. He is to be congratulated on bringing together much interesting material, including the first substantial discussion of two unpublished pieces by Powell (his 1934 Fellowship dissertation for Trinity

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1 Fromentin–Gotteland–Payen (2010); Harloe and Morley (2012); Lee and Morley (2015); North and Mack (2019).

2 Murari Pires (2007); Meister (2013); Morley (2014); Iori (2015); Piovan (2019).
College, Cambridge, and his 1936 Classical Association lecture, summarised in PCA (1936)). But while the subject is of absorbing interest, E.’s monograph is unfortunately marred throughout by weaknesses in scholarship, argumentation, and presentation. In the course of this review I will first discuss E.’s broader approach to changing patterns in scholarship, and then address problems in his arguments chapter by chapter; given that his book is the first monograph devoted to this period of Thucydidean reception in Britain, I have thought it helpful to document further errors or omissions on points of detail and interpretation in an Appendix (numbers in bold in the review refer ahead to this).

Changing Scholarly Trends

A recurrent problem in The Thucydidean Turn is E.’s tendency to make bold but unsubstantiated claims about important historical changes in the interpretation of Thucydides. These big historical claims make for a lively read: our interest is often roused by the statement that a certain scholar was the ‘first’ to present Thucydides in a particular way, and the liveliness is enhanced by an occasional tendency to speculate about the development of individual scholars in a manner typical of some popular biographies (see, e.g., 27, 29–31). These narratives, however, are systematically impressionistic and unreliable. To pick on one of his more casual claims, E. suggests in his introductory chapter that increasing academic interest in Thucydides in the first half of the twentieth century was accompanied by ‘a rise in his presence in British literary culture’ (13). The evidence offered for this claim is a single letter mentioning Thucydides which was published by the Manchester Guardian in 1925. E. does not consider any of the manifestations of Thucydides’ presence in earlier literary culture: the numerous mentions in Victorian periodicals; allusions in Macaulay’s much-read Essays; translations in Bohn’s Classical Library, and two series published by J. M. Dent, Temple Classics and the Everyman Library; references in popular school stories such as Tom Brown’s Schooldays or P. G. Wodehouse’s early works (for instance, the dialogue of Smith, Conscience, and Meph. in Tales of St Austin’s); or even earlier appearances in the Guardian, which prior to the First World War published reviews of Thucydides Mythistoricus as well as of various school editions of Thucydides (its long-serving editor and owner C. P. Scott had a First in Greats).

The central claims that support E.’s notion of a ‘Thucydidean turn’ are that the first half of the twentieth century saw both an increase in academic interest in Thucydides, including the first ‘academic monographs’ in English, Jane Harrison’s Primitive Athens as Described by Thucydides and Cornford’s Thucydides Mythistoricus, and a move towards seeing Thucydides as a political
theorist rather than a scientific historian. The first claim is true enough—though better seen as a mark of the slow professionalisation of academia in Britain than of a distinctive turn towards Thucydides. But E. underplays the importance of the numerous earlier English discussions of Thucydides which can be found in periodicals, in histories of Greek literature and histories of Greece, and in commentaries on the Greek text, and where he does turn to earlier accounts he presents a simplified sketch of their contents. Writers in the nineteenth century (and earlier) were not just interested in Thucydides as a scientific historian: they discussed him as a philosophical writer, a historian who was not just a source of isolated exempla, but who taught a broader political wisdom. It was this vision of Thucydides that was encapsulated in the ‘turn’ to Thucydides in Literae Humaniores (‘Greats’) at Oxford after 1850 under the aegis of Benjamin Jowett (not mentioned by E.), who besides translating Thucydides helped generations of (especially Balliol) men schooled in Thucydides to gain administrative positions within the British empire.

E.’s treatment of changing interpretations of Thucydides is further undermined by his selective handling of twentieth-century approaches. He does not support his core argument that Thucydides’ role shifted from historian to political philosopher by looking at how ancient historians conceived of Thucydides. There is no mention of scholars from the first half of the century such as M. N. Tod, E. M. Walker, or Toynbee’s schoolmate H. T. Wade-Gery in the United Kingdom, or W. S. Ferguson, W. K. Prentice, and B. D. Meritt in North America, let alone of any of their numerous successors since the Second World War. The increasing use of Thucydides outside Classics departments is an interesting story, but (even if he is no longer quite our colleague—to the extent that he ever was) he is still a prime source for ancient historians and for scholars of historiography.

Impressionistic, too, is E.’s account of the causes of the changes he posits in scholarly attitudes to Thucydides. He speaks interchangeably, for instance, of ‘the Boer War’ and ‘the Boer Wars’, as if it made no difference (he seems in fact to mean the war of 1899–1902, not the much shorter war fought from December 1880 to March 1881). With regard to the First World War, he does not probe the more detailed correspondences that many contemporaries saw between that war and the Peloponnesian War; on several occasions, moreover, he invokes in rather general terms the horror of the trenches without explaining why those horrors would lead to a greater toleration of Thucydides’ realism (as opposed to the renewed appropriation of the spiritual force of Hellenism that can be seen in volumes such as Livingstone (1921)).

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3 Macaulay marks in his 1828 essay ‘History’ as heterodox his own view that Thucydides was far from being a ‘really philosophical historian’, his ‘political philosophy’ being merely that of his time and place (Macaulay (1910) 12).

This is not to say that E. is wrong to search for changes: as the rest of this review will suggest, what is needed is a more nuanced and evidence-based approach to change.

**Labelling Thucydides**

The problem with analysing change emerges at once in E.’s Introduction, which offers a sketch of the history of the ‘labels’ that scholars have supposedly applied to Thucydides. E. argues both that these labels tend to simplify and pigeonhole Thucydides’ thought and that they became more diverse in the first half of the twentieth century as scholars moved away from the nineteenth-century tendency to read Thucydides as a scientific historian; in the rest of the book he builds on this analysis, concluding that while Thucydides was ‘a Realpolitiker’ for Powell, ‘for Cornford, he was a tragedian; for Zimmern, a psychologist; for Toynbee, a contemporary; for Cochrane, a scientist; and for Abbott, a realist’ (141).

E.’s treatment of labels lacks conceptual sharpness. He does not explore the difference between calling Thucydides X not Y and calling him X as well as Y: different passages from Zimmern (e.g., the passage cited on p. 182 n. 15) could be used to support the claim that he labelled Thucydides an anthropologist, a sociologist, or a geographer (as well as a historian). Nor does E. draw the necessary distinction between calling Thucydides X and offering a description from which E. himself extrapolates the label X: he includes Mably in his survey of the history of labels, but Mably does not offer any sort of label in the passage cited on p. 7 (nor does E. supply one); he simply compares the passions of ancient Greece and modern Europe. It is E. himself who pigeonholes the scholars who supposedly pigeonhole Thucydides.

While I will discuss further some of E.’s other labels below, it is worth pausing here on his treatment in the Introduction of the label that is perhaps most important for his book as a whole: ‘realist’. E.’s general thesis is that the First World War led to a more sympathetic understanding of Thucydides’ realism; at the same time, he traces the ‘realist’ label back to the opposition between the realists Thucydides and Machiavelli and the idealist Plato drawn by Nietzsche in *Twilight of the Idols*. Here too, however, the language of ‘labels’ is not helpful. Nietzsche did not label Thucydides a ‘realist’ in the manner of modern political scientists who are interested in the structures of interstate relations or in the workings of fear, honour, and self-interest. Rather, he placed him in the realist culture of the sophists, at the tail end of the realist culture of archaic Greece—the culture that would later be captured in Hugh Lloyd-
Jones’ mantra (itself partly inspired by Nietzsche) that the Greeks could bear reality more than most.\(^5\)

Nietzsche poses a problem for E.’s general focus on the influence of the First World War on Thucydidean scholarship. E. seeks to remove this problem by suggesting that Nietzsche was reading against the grain of many of his contemporaries. The realist tag can, however, be traced well beyond Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s comparison between Thucydides and Machiavelli was anticipated by, among others, the historian George Long, who wrote in 1864 that he saw ‘no difference in the political wisdom of Thucydides and Machiavelli’, as ‘both these great men looked at human affairs as they are, and they have told us how princes and leaders of states have acted and will act as long as states and princes exist’.\(^6\) That it was commonplace to apply the language of realism and Realpolitik to Thucydides can be seen from the preface of an 1871 volume of translated extracts from the speeches (‘sie behandeln … Grundsätze der Realpolitik, die nie veralten’),\(^7\) and still more emphatically from a passage in Heinrich Welzhofer’s 1878 monograph Thukydidès und sein Geschichtswerk where (unlike in Twilight of the Idols) the question of labelling Thucydides is explicitly raised:


\(^7\) Beck (1871) v (‘they treat principles of Realpolitik which never become old’).

\(^8\) Welzhofer (1878) 144 (‘If it were necessary to describe his philosophical point of view with a single word, then here too the word “realistic” must again be the most accurate. Because his views were realistic not only against the ideas and the religious beliefs of the masses but also against the mystical outpourings of the poets and the transcendental
Nietzsche’s view of Thucydides was memorably expressed, but quite conventional.

E. does at times seem to show some awareness of the conventionality of this image of Thucydides. On p. xii he writes that ‘as early as J. P. Mahaffy, writing in 1874, scholars have questioned whether Thucydides … really could have been so realist’. While misleading about Mahaffy (132–3), this statement implies that it was conventional to view Thucydides as a realist. That is not to say that the way Thucydides’ realism has been conceived has not changed—and some of the value of E.’s book lies in the hints it offers as to those changes. But for the most part his reflections on realism are distorted by the teleological narrative he constructs of a scholarly path from Thucydides as history to Thucydides as political philosophy.

Cornford: Thucydides the Tragedian

The first of E.’s substantial case-studies focuses on F. M. Cornford’s *Thucydides Mythistoricus* (1907). E. first outlines Cornford’s theories that Thucydides misunderstood the commercial causes of the Peloponnesian War and adopted the outlines of an Aeschylean and Herodotean plot in narrating the Athenian success at Pylos and its aftermath. Noting that Cornford himself later acknowledged the influence of the Boer War on his view of the causes of the Peloponnesian War, he proceeds to argue that his presentation of Thucydides as a tragedian carried a political message for contemporary Britain.

While E. offers much useful information on Cornford, there are two main problems in the chapter. First, labels: did Cornford actually view Thucydides as ‘a tragedian’? Well, he did once call him that—but in a jocular tone (1907) 151: ‘after all Thucydides was only an amateur tragedian’). In fact, as E. for the most part correctly analyses (but see 26, 32, 38), the thrust of *Thucydides Mythistoricus* is not that Thucydides was a tragedian, but that he unconsciously drew on mythical conceptions of the passions. This is presumably why E. at one point (171) replaces the label ‘a tragedian’ with ‘a Mythistoricus’ (sic: the word is an epithet, not a noun)—though even here it is worth stressing that Cornford’s title is a compound of the two parts of the book, entitled *Thucydides Historicus* and *Thucydides Mythicus*. Cornford did not reduce Thucydides to any one label.

constructions of the philosophers of his time. His opinions were realistic about the process and the motors of history, about gods and oracles, about natural events and human power. Realistic was his morality, which saw man as a being full of wild passions, always inclined to evil and foolishness, impotent in his will and work. His policy was realistic and never raved about utopian social conditions and ideal constitutional forms. Because of its realism, his historiography differs heaven-wide from Herodotus’ historiography.’).
More problematic are E.’s attempts to claim that Cornford is relevant to the political themes of his book. He notes that Cornford states in his preface that historians in his own day might be unconsciously influenced by evolutionary models in the same way that Thucydides was influenced by tragic patterns. But there is nothing to support E.’s idea that Cornford thought that the tragic passions might still be at work in his own day (e.g., 19) or that Britain was locked into a tragic pattern (e.g., 26); after all, Cornford did not think that these tragic passions were at work in Thucydides’ day (they are a survival of a mythic mode of thought that moulded Thucydides’ interpretation). The continuity that Cornford saw was in commercially-motivated imperialism; it related to factors that, on Cornford’s reading, Thucydides failed to understand.

Zimmern: Thucydides the Psychologist

In the next chapter, E. turns to A. E. Zimmern, a fascinating figure who abandoned at an early stage the career of an Oxford Classics don and returned to Oxford two decades later as a professor of International Relations. E. argues for a shift in Zimmern’s view of Thucydides: before the First World War, his interest was historical and he felt an ‘aversion’ to Thucydides ‘rooted in his dislike of the Athenian historian’s empirical realism’9 and his supposed support for the military excesses of the Athenian Empire; after the war, his focus turned more to contemporary events and he ‘came to embrace Thucydides’ realism as the foundation of his methodology of “political psychology”’. E.’s analysis suffers from his desire to trace developments in response to contemporary events. For one thing, his biographical narrative is undermined by the subsequent admission that Zimmern’s The Greek Commonwealth (1911) is profoundly concerned with Britain’s contemporary position (it is odd that he does not spend more time on the manifold uses of Thucydides in this major work, or on subsequent uses of the translation of the Epitaphios that Zimmern included in it).10 For another, it involves misrepresentations of Zimmern’s essays ‘Thucydides the Imperialist’ (dated by E. to 1905: see 181 n. 9) and ‘Political Thought’ (published in the 1921 volume The Legacy of Greece).11

9 A term adopted from Morley’s (2018a) tripartite model of realism; on p. 82, E. more accurately invokes Morley’s second class of realism, ‘realism as a sensibility’, in connection with Zimmern.

10 Thucydides’ position in this book is seriously underplayed in E.’s comment that it is only in the final chapter that he ‘can no longer be ignored’ (58): he has been mentioned hundreds of times by that point.

11 Scarcely the ‘obscure volume’ that E. makes it (78): it was repeatedly re-printed and issued in paperback in 1969; ‘deservedly still popular’ is how it is described by Moses Finley in the 1981 replacement (sub-titled A New Appraisal).
Zimmern’s pre-war treatments are far from suggesting a dislike based on Thucydides’ support for the Athenian empire’s excesses. Thucydides is presented as a patriotic Periclean who espoused a liberal view of empire—a view with which Zimmern himself sympathised. Zimmern then tracks closely Thucydides’ analysis of the decay that set in with the plague and the war-spirit. He does not criticise Thucydides for supporting Athenian brutalities; he thinks that Thucydides saw those brutalities as resulting from the stupidity of Jingoism, and again it is clear that he agrees with Thucydides. Where he does find fault with Thucydides is for not empathising with individual suffering; it is not clear that he changed his mind about this after the war.

Zimmern’s post-war engagements with Thucydides do show a concern with his psychology, but not quite in the way E. portrays it. Zimmern wrote that ‘we have only to read his immortal analysis of the war-mood of Greece, and of the nervous and emotional phenomena which accompanied it, to realize that his first effort would have been to explain us to ourselves’ ((1921) 338–9). He then cited Thuc. 3.82.2 and concluded that ‘Thucydides would have had eyes for [the war-mood] in all its form, mild or severe, simple or complex, pitiful or repulsive’. He does not, as E. claims, suggest that ‘each polis/state possesses a unique political psychology conditioned by history, culture and power and it is the genius of Thucydides to explain how these different psychologies interact and collide’ (74); nor does he remind us that ‘even if the Spartans were motivated by fear to start the Peloponnesian War, other psychological states were at play in Athens, Corinth, Argos and a host of other significant states’. Rather, Zimmern uses Thucydides’ analysis of stasis as a springboard for imagining the sort of analysis that a modern Thucydides might offer of the situation of the European states. He does not offer the sort of detailed proto-constructivist reading of Thucydides E. appears to suggest (and E. offers no suggestions as to how such a reading might be extracted); indeed, he does not offer any detailed readings of Thucydides in the essays he wrote after he abandoned his career in Classics and became more interested in the League of Nations (a topic on which he thought Thucydides offered no help ((1921) 327)).

Zimmern’s interest in Thucydides’ psychological thought in any case pre-dates the war. In ‘Thucydides the Imperialist’, he suggested that the Peloponnesian War turned ‘the best Athenians’ into ‘morose psychologists’ and that the sophists taught Thucydides ‘to explain politics by psychology’ ((1928) 92, 93). And in The Greek Commonwealth, he noted ‘Thucydides’ continual insistence on psychology’ ((1911) 177 n. 1, citing ‘especially iii. 45 where, as Cornford has shown in his Thucydides Mythistoricus, mythology is transformed into psychology’; cf. 179 n. 1), and devoted a large section to exploring ‘national psychology’ ((1911) 65) via what is repeatedly presented as a sort of commentary on the Funeral Oration (cf. (1928) 89). At the same time, Zimmern stressed the power of Thucydides’ analysis of social circumstances, a quality especially seen in the stasis section (the passage he references in his 1921 essay). Thucydides 3.82.2 (including the translation ‘War … makes men’s characters fit their conditions’) is the epigraph of the final chapter of The Greek Commonwealth, and in an essay first published in 1910–11 Zimmern wrote of the attraction for ‘readers who can face realities’ in being ‘initiated with Thucydides into the interplay between character and circumstance which is the soul of great history’
This dual focus on psychology and social analysis was strongly informed by the writings of the social theorist Graham Wallas.\textsuperscript{12}

It is not the case that E. is wrong to search for differences over time in Zimmern's interest in Thucydides. But he might have done better to argue that Zimmern was concerned with Thucydides before the war mainly as a proponent of liberal imperialism and after it mainly as an analyst of the effects of war on society.\textsuperscript{13}

**Abbott: Thucydides the Realist**

E.'s next chapter looks at British perceptions of Thucydides’ contemporaneity during and after the First World War. His main focus is G. F. Abbott’s 1925 monograph *Thucydides: A Study in Historical Reality*, which offers, he suggests, an appreciation of Thucydides’ realist view of human nature that was deepened by the author’s wartime experiences. This argument is supported by a pleasing sketch of Abbott—a Cambridge undergraduate who became a journalist and wrote books on the modern politics of Greece and Turkey as well as on his travels in Macedonia and Northern Africa. But the evidence E. offers that the war changed Abbott’s view of Thucydides’ realism turns out to be slim. He points to the romantic feeling for the variety of humankind shown in a 1912 travel book (97–8), but that feeling is entirely compatible with a sense of a universal human nature (witness, e.g., Walter Scott). And the book on Thucydides itself points to differences in human development, between Greece and Thrace in antiquity, and between Britain and Burma in the twentieth century (1925 227, 14).

While E. is right to stress that Abbott foregrounds his increased sense of Thucydides’ contemporaneity during the First World War, he seems to exaggerate the importance of Abbott’s work in the history of Thucydidean scholarship. It is underwhelming to be told that that ‘the most significant aspect of Abbott’s interpretation of human nature in Thucydides is that it suggests that history repeats itself’ (97). And while it is a lively read, Abbott’s work is full of broad-brush comments that are a far cry from the way Thucydidean realism is studied in the modern academy: e.g. (on 5.105), “Thucydides … has called attention to the cynical principle which still governs the conduct of states … as a universal law. It is only one of the traits which differentiate him from [Herodotus] and bring him into line with modern

\textsuperscript{12} E. notes the importance of Wallas for Zimmern (56), but not that Wallas had taught Zimmern Thucydides at Winchester College.

\textsuperscript{13} See Millett (2007) 199 n. 46 for references to Zimmern’s invocations of Thuc. 3.82.2 in his post-war International Relations writings.
realists’ (12); or again: ‘He knew, what many a modern realist has yet to learn, that the essential alone is real always and everywhere’ (191). As it happens, these two comments are the closest Abbott comes to labelling Thucydides a realist: he mostly refers (as in his title) to Thucydides’ depiction of ‘reality’.

**Toynbee: Thucydides the Contemporary**

In Chapter 5 E. turns to the much more complex historical thought of Arnold Toynbee. The question he poses is a fascinating one: were the grand theories outlined in *A Study of History* shaped by a new understanding of Thucydides during the First World War? E.’s answer is that Toynbee did not just, like Abbott, come to see Thucydides as a contemporary during the war, but that his new understanding of Thucydides led to his broader comparative approach to the rise and fall of civilisations; he further suggests that Toynbee’s understanding of the patterns of history was influenced by his reading of Cornford’s *Thucydides Mythistoricus*.

As with Zimmern and Abbott, E. in some ways exaggerates the significance of the war as a turning-point for Toynbee. First, he writes that ‘before the Great War, Toynbee lived in a Victorian world of order and stability that he imagined might last forever’ (109) and that this world was shattered by the war. This clichéd image will hardly bear scrutiny. Toynbee matured intellectually in an Edwardian world highly conscious of the dangers of imperial decline; he was himself fascinated by historical change, particularly after a long walking-tour in Greece in 1911–12; and any sense of stability was undermined by his father’s commitment to a mental institution in 1909 and by his family’s financial difficulties.14 Second, it was not the war that led Toynbee to compare the development of different civilisations: in the lecture E. cites where Toynbee speaks of his discovery of Thucydides’ contemporaneity, Toynbee states that he grasped the parallel development of the Hellenic and Western Christian civilisations during his walking tour of Greece.15

In other ways E. underplays the importance of the war for Toynbee’s reading of Thucydides. It was now that Toynbee came to see 431 BC and AD 1914 as parallel moments in the breakdown of the two civilisations, and, despite numerous criticisms, he remained committed to this extremely odd reading of Graeco-Roman history for the rest of his life. E., however, tends to obscure the oddness of Toynbee’s plotting of history by presenting 431 BC as one of a

14 All amply documented in McNeill (1989), a work E. cites. For Toynbee’s premonitions, see, e.g., the letter written in December 1911 (cited by McNeill, p. 41): ‘we shall be “dagos” too when civilization centres in China.’

series of crises rather than the Hellenic Civilisation’s decisive moment of breakdown.

What of the suggestion that Toynbee was influenced by Cornford’s reading of Thucydides? E. suggests that Thucydides Mythistoricus was Toynbee’s source for the presence of tragic cycles in Greek thought (123) and that ‘in common with Cornford, Toynbee thought that perhaps the archaic states hubris, nemesis and phthonos survive in the modern world, indeed in all civilizations’ (125). To support these suggestions, he points to Toynbee’s recommendation in his 1924 compendium Greek Historical Thought of Cornford’s treatment of Greek religion—but the work of Cornford’s he was puffing was not Thucydides Mythistoricus, but Greek Religious Thought, a volume published in the same series as Greek Historical Thought (J. M. Dent’s Library of Greek Thought, edited by Ernest Barker). E. also points to Toynbee’s acknowledgement that Cornford taught him to indicate by the use of capital letters ‘the presence of one of those psychic principalities and powers … for which there are no proper names in the sterilized vocabulary of a rationalist latter-day Western Society’. But the abstractions that are paraded (‘Hilm and Aidôs, Civilization and Democracy and Industrialism, Archaism and Futurism …’) in the passage of late Toynbee mysticism that E. cites scarcely bear comparison with Cornford’s analysis of Thucydides (nor does E. analyse how Toynbee actually uses these abstractions). Finally, E. cites a passage when Toynbee wrote of the operation of ‘blind and irrational forces’. But he was not there referring to abstractions such as Cornford’s Atê or Nemesis (as E. assumes); he was picking up a phrase from R. G. Collingwood (cited earlier on the same page) that refers to the precipitous actions of politicians.

The main problem with E.’s suggestion that Cornford influenced Toynbee is that it involves a misunderstanding of both thinkers. Toynbee cannot have shared Cornford’s conviction that archaic forces survive in the modern world: as we have seen, Cornford did not have that conviction himself (at most they survived in Thucydides’ mind). And while Toynbee does in A Study of History explicitly talk about the ‘Nemesis of creativity’ ((1934–61) IV.243–584), and include in his discussion of this nemesis a long subsection headed ‘Kópos, Ὕβρις, Ἀτη’, he sees these as universal patterns, not as archaic forces. In grouping phthonos with hubris and nemesis, moreover, E. overlooks Toynbee’s express dismissal of phthonos—or ‘the Envy of the Gods’—as a ‘primitive’ belief that was first overcome by Aeschylus ((1934–61) IV.249–59).16 To have allowed a role to phthonos would have undermined Toynbee’s consistent claim that civilisations break down because of internal, not external, factors.17

16 Cf. already Toynbee (1924) 137–8, where a translation of Aesch. Agam. 750–81 is printed under the heading ‘The Revised Version’.
17 The best evidence for Cornford’s possible influence is not cited by E.—the appreciative discussion at Toynbee (1934–61) X.124–5 of how Cornford’s analysis of the psychological model of Greek tragedy was ‘prescient’ of Jungian ideas: ‘In the “autonomous complex” erupting from the abyss of a Subconscious Psyche to challenge the sovereignty of a Conscious Will that must either subdue the intruder or suffer the consequences of becoming its slave, we are manifestly presented with a “scientific” name for the kôr or daimon that assails the hero of an Attic tragedy.’ Toynbee insists nonetheless that ‘the full-blooded language of Hellenic mythology falls wide of the truth in portraying these dread principalities and
E., then, seems vastly to overstate the influence of Cornford on Toynbee’s thought. It would, perhaps, have been more apposite to cite the conclusion of Toynbee’s biographer W. H. McNeill (1989: 288) that Toynbee himself underwent the same journey from rationalising to mythological thought that Cornford detected in Thucydides.

**Powell: Thucydides the Realpolitiker**

In Chapter 6, E. discusses the two unpublished pieces by Enoch Powell mentioned above: the 1936 CA paper and the longer Fellowship dissertation. Interested readers will be able to scrutinise E.’s arguments more fully after the forthcoming publication of these texts by Ivan Matijašić in a Supplementary Volume of this journal. Prior to that publication, E.’s discussion does at least offer a taste of Powell’s crisp analysis of the influence of the First World War and its aftermath (including the rise of Nazism) on Thucydidean scholarship and of his longer exploration of Thucydides’ moral and political principles. While Powell’s analysis raises some doubts over E.’s initial claim that the effect of the war was greater in Britain than elsewhere, he does emerge as a supporter of E.’s overarching thesis that the war altered attitudes to Thucydides’ realism. But what Powell meant by saying that scholars had become more tolerant of Thucydides since the war was that some of them (and above all Eduard Schwartz) expressed views close to Powell’s own reading of that realism. To what extent that judgement is a disinterested one is a question that would repay further exploration: Schwartz’s reading of the Melian Dialogue as a defence of Athenian imperialism met immediate resistance, for instance, from Pohlenz (1919: 132–3).

Once again the value of E.’s analysis is marred by carelessness and misunderstanding. He misrepresents the history of Powell’s writings on Thucydides (138) as well as several of his comments on Thucydidean scholarship. Powell did not claim, for instance, that ‘because Schwartz wrote during wartime, he saw the Athenian position [in the Melian Dialogue] as objectionable and logically unanswerable’ (147): ‘objectionable’ should be ‘morally unobjectionable’ (p. 63 of the Fellowship dissertation, Churchill Archives powers as conscious and wilful personalities’. Cf. also III.256 for the relation of the Cambridge ritualists’ eniautos daimôn to Toynbee’s idea of withdrawal-and-return.

18 A better line of investigation might be whether Cornford influenced some of Toynbee’s observations on the mythical patterns underlying modern scientific thought (e.g., Toynbee (1934–61) I.275–6).

19 I am grateful to Ivan for sharing his preliminary transcriptions and photographs, and to the J. Enoch Powell Literary Trustees for allowing me to refer to this material.

20 See also Morley (2018b) for responses to Thucydides in Germany during the war.

21 Powell’s strong admiration for Schwartz, clear from the preface to Powell (1939), is amply shown in the unpublished writings.
Centre, POLL 1/6/24). Nor did Schwartz claim that the Athenian position was hybrisitic: he presented the dialogue’s stress on necessity as part of Thucydides’ defence of Periclean imperialism after the Athenian defeat in 404 BC. Powell disagreed only with Schwartz’s condemnation of the Melian argument (he thought Schwartz had been misled by German war-time feeling). See also 132–3 for another particularly misleading comment on Powell’s view of earlier scholarship.

E. misreports, too, one of Powell’s more striking political comments. He states (152) that Powell offers ‘the rather cryptic thought that Britain is reaping what she sowed in Ireland and India, in Poland and Czechoslovakia’, and then makes a rather desperate attempt to explain what Powell might have meant. The thought Powell actually offered was that Britain was reaping in Ireland and India what she sowed in Poland and Czechoslovakia; he thought that Britain had breached the natural law (invoked by Athens in the Melian Dialogue) that imperial states should stand together.22 Related to this thought is Powell’s provocative anachronism (cited by E. on pp. 152–3) that Germany could point to Thucydides’ condemnation of the Versailles treaty at 4.19. That is, Powell was berating Britain for encouraging national independence movements and for being too harsh to a defeated imperial rival—in effect, for not practising Realpolitik.

More broadly, the chapter does not really explain the difference between the labels ‘realist’ (applied to Abbott’s Thucydides) and ‘Realpolitiker’ (applied to Powell’s). E. does make a distinction between theoretical realism and practical Realpolitik (143), but this distinction does not help because, as he at once acknowledges, Powell did not think that Thucydides’ work had a practical goal.

**Presentational Problems**

The problems in the arguments of *The Thucydidean Turn* are compounded by numerous problems in the presentation.

1. E.’s English expressions are often clumsy and imprecise, and his longer sentences sometimes strain the rules of grammar. Here are just a few examples: 35: ‘to gain an advantage over Athens’ commercial rivalry with Corinth’ seems to mean ‘to gain a commercial advantage over her rival Corinth’; 55: ‘animosity, even disgust, to’ should be ‘… at’; 76: ‘the former … the latter’ are the wrong way round; 84: ‘Perhaps, …, are we so different …?’ needs to be ‘… we are not so different …’; 94: ‘Thucydides believes that he can identify the names of modern tribes and peoples from the names of ancient tribal chiefs’ (‘with’ for ‘from’ would make more sense); 95: the second and third limbs of the four-limb sentence starting ‘The speech of the Corcyrean envoys …’ make no sense (they do not have verbs); 114: ‘a synthesis view’; 133: ‘manifests itself … by’ needs to be ‘is manifested … by’; 135: ‘not only to the value … but also of the need’ (‘of’ should

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22 Fellowship dissertation, 97. Powell’s brief treatment does not address the role of other parties to the Versailles treaty: post-war Britain was not in the position of Sparta in 404 BC.
be ‘to’); 159: ‘Lord explains to his audience … to the equivalence …; and to the sad fate’ (the last two instances of ‘to’ need to be deleted).

2. E.’s presentation of Greek is shaky: he writes as if ὀφέλιμος were a noun (150, 152: read ὀφελία); uses an omicron in ἔρως (38, 71, 223 bis); and makes mistakes in transliterations (19: ‘each individual poleis’; 37: althestaten; 150: philonekia; 152 esuchia) and accents (38, 71, 227: for πείθω read πειθώ (i.e., the noun, not the verb)); 147: read ἀναγκαία).

3. There are mistakes in other foreign languages and in loan-words: 8: ‘protégée’ should be ‘protégé’ (Levesque was a man); 134: ‘Fürhrer’; 144: ‘gemessen’ for ‘gewesen’; 167: ‘emigré’ for ‘émigré’.

4. There are inaccurate quotations: Cornford wrote not that Thucydides’ observations on human nature are ‘less noble’ (39) than those of modern novelists, which would have been an odd thing to say, but that they are ‘less subtle’; ‘is presented in miniature [as] a world’ (105, from Abbott) should read ‘presented in miniature a world’; 118: the Greek phrase τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται (from Hdt. 5.66.2) is omitted from Toynbee’s summary of the plot of Hellenic Civilisation (leaving the obscure ‘Constantine—tribesmen on to the land, bishops into the bureaucracy’); and in the block quotation from Toynbee on p. 124, the omission of one line from the original has left ‘a tell-tale lacuna in things in Heaven and Earth than are dreamed of in Horatio’s western Philosophy’.

5. The referencing is full of problems. Despite E.’s historical approach, bibliographical items (e.g., Arnold (2010); Jebb (1907); Grote (2010)) are often cited only by reprints without any indication of their first publication dates; some items are cited by different dates in the text and in the Bibliography (e.g., Verrall (1895)/(1913); Murray (1897)/(1903); Connor (1984)/(2013)). There are quite a few mistakes, too, with publication dates and referencing: ix, 210: Morley’s book as published in 2014, not 2013; 7: E. cites explicitly from Mably’s Two dialogues (which was written in 1783) but gives the reference ‘1769: x–xi’, and the Bibliography lists a different work by Mably, Phocion’s Conversations, under that date; 8: ‘xvii’ should be ‘xxvii’; 10: Twilight of the Idols was published in 1889, not 1887; 12: Harrison’s Primitive Athens was published in 1906 (as rightly on p. 204), not 1904; 79: for de Romilly (1956) (on fear), E. presumably meant to cite ‘La crainte dans l’œuvre de Thucydide’, C&G 17 (1956) 119–127 rather than Histoire et raison chez Thucydide (which was published in that year too; the bibliography gives no indication that what is cited as de Romilly (2012) is a translation of that work); 65, 182 n. 11: the second edition of The Greek Commonwealth was published in 1915, not 1914; 123, 189 n. 16: Toynbee’s Greek Historical Thought was published in 1924, not 1922; 123: ‘1907; 219, 233’ is wrongly repeated from earlier in the paragraph—the reference should be ‘1924: viii’; 148: for ‘Pohlenz 1919’ read ‘Schwartz 1919’; 164: Shorey (1897) should be Shorey (1893); 177 n. 9: ‘Cornford and Verrall 1913’ is a misleading way to refer to a section of a memoir of Verrall included in an edition of Verrall’s writings in which the editors offer a long quotation from a letter by Cornford; 184 n. 9: for ‘Hutton (1910, 1917)’ read ‘Hutton (1911)’ (Hutton (1910) is notes on Herodotus and Thucydides, not a general essay on Herodotus); 198, 208, 218: Bedford and Workman (2001), Markwell (1986), and Welch (2003) were all published in Review of International Studies, not in Kokusaigaku Review = Obirin Review of International Studies; 208: Mazower’s 2007 chapter on Zimmern is part of a monograph, not a chapter in an edited volume; 211: the entries for ‘Murray, G.’ (2015)

6. A similar level of carelessness is found in the treatment of names and titles: 12, 88, 179 n. 23: William Hutton (read ‘Maurice Hutton’); 51: MacLeod (read ‘Macleod’); 55: Caldeb (read ‘Calder’—also on 199, where ‘Caldeb, W. M.’ is the same as the ‘Calder, W. III’ of the next two bibliographical entries); 55, 78: *Greek Political Thought* (read *Political Thought*); 69, 223: Coulange (read ‘Coulanges’); 91, 206 Kellogg Wood (read ‘Kellogg Wood’); 92: Abbot; 132, 148, 228 Schadewelt (read ‘Schadewaldt’); 133: *Neus Thukididesbild* (read *Neues Thukydidestild* or *Das neue Thukydidestild*); 154: Sinclair (read ‘Sinclair’); 193 n. 9, 221: Schoefield (read ‘Schofield’); 197: the first edition of *CAH V* ends in 401 BC, not 404 BC; 199: Chartham (read ‘Chatham’); 206, 211, 216, 217: Rengagkos (read ‘Rengakos’); 210: Hollingsworth (read ‘Hollingworth’); 228, 229: *Disciple of Punishment* (read *Discipline of Punishment*). In the bibliography the title of Lee and Morley (2015) is at times *A Handbook …*, at times *The Blackwell Handbook …*.

7. On top of the mistakes listed above there are many other typographical errors (or else remnants of earlier stages of writing): e.g., 148: ‘these sentences are shocking … and remains so’; 193 n. 8 ‘The only mentions … is’.

I regret having had to write so negative a review of the first book of someone who is described as an independent scholar. This work is marred by numerous instances of factual error and implausible interpretation. Some of the problems spring from one of the book’s strengths—its concerted attempt to bridge the gap between classical scholarship and political science—insofar as this attempt has introduced teleological elements into the narrative. The focus on a ‘turn’ from Classics to Political Science has been at the expense of a more fully fleshed-out investigation of the academic milieu: it is striking that four of his five main actors gained Fellowships soon after graduation at the Oxbridge colleges at which they had been undergraduates, and that the three who abandoned academic careers in Classics achieved international prominence. E.’s approach has been at the expense, too, of a deeper exploration of the extent to which British receptions of Thucydides see him as typical of his age (along with other ‘contemporaries’ such as Euripides) in a manner importantly removed from the procedures commonly found in political science. There is still scope, moreover, for a deeper analysis of how Thucydidean receptions in the closing decades of the British empire relate to discourses of empire, war, and democracy.23 But I should not end without stressing the positive points of

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23 In 1914, the Royal Colonial Institute set Thuc. 3.37.1 (democracy’s inability to manage an empire) as the theme for its annual monograph competition. There are also interesting references to Thucydides in Cramb’s (1900) *Reflections on the Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain* (noted by Jenkyns (1981)); Curzon’s (1910) *Ancient and Modern Imperialism*; and in a letter written in 1909 by C. E. Montague (son-in-law of C. P. Scott): ‘[Thucydides] even described the Jingo press during the Boer War with great minuteness’ (cited by Ogilvie (1964)). Zimmern himself used the language of Jingoism (resonant of late Victorian and Edwardian
The Thucydidean Turn. E. is energetic and wide-ranging; he offers some useful discussions which shed light on the history of political readings of Thucydides; and he has drawn attention to some interesting instances of Thucydidean reception that have not been discussed previously and that merit further exploration. I have enjoyed re-visiting some older figures in the history of Thucydidean scholarship and discovering much that was new to me.

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Appendix: Further Comments and Corrections

6: E. claims that Cic. Orat. 30–2 labels Thucydides ‘Attic’ and that this label points to the problem of using Thucydides as a rhetorical model. In fact, while that passage follows from a discussion of Atticism which covers orators such as Demosthenes whom Cicero did value as rhetorical models, Cicero is not labelling Thucydides but criticising his idealisation by Thucydideani. Nor does Cicero berate Thucydides for being long-winded: he refers to his words as ‘mutilated’ and ‘disconnected’ (just as in other works he stresses that Thucydides crams many thoughts into few words).

8: Levesque described the History as the text that should be ‘most studied in countries where all the citizens could one day have some part in the government’ (not as ‘the one text which every citizen of a free state should read’).

12: Zimmern, The Greek Commonwealth and Solon and Croesus are not monographs on Thucydides.

12, 138: Powell’s Fellowship dissertation was written in 1934, not 1936.

13: E. might have noted (with Abbott (1925) 191 n. 1) that the ‘famous definition of aggression’ to which David Mitrany alluded in his letter to the Guardian is the Geneva Protocol, and that Mitrany was suggesting that the US General Tasker H. Bliss (a renowned fan of Thucydides) had been directly influenced by Thuc. 1.34. (The issue of arbitration which is raised in that passage was, it is interesting to note, flagged by Richard Crawley ((1910) xi) in the preface to his translation with a nod towards contemporary problems: ‘[The reader] will see the doctrine of arbitration, welcomed as a newly-discovered panacea by our amiable enthusiasts, more firmly established in theory than it is yet likely to be in modern Europe.’)

26: Nemesis is not a psychological state for Cornford.

Britain) of Cleon. Fuller exploration of this Edwardian imperial discourse would even shed light on the origins of Graham Allison’s Thucydides trap—since the translation Allison uses for 1.23.6, ‘… made war inevitable’, first made its appearance in the revision of Richard Crawley’s translation by his nephew Richard Feetham, who was himself later closely tied to British imperial and post-imperial interests (as a member of Milner’s Kindergarten in South Africa and as Chairman of the Irish Boundary Commission); the revision was published in 1903 (the same year as The Riddle of the Sands).
27: the Headlam who translated Aeschylus was not the theologian Arthur Headlam of King’s College London, but his cousin, the classicist Walter Headlam (1866–1908) of King’s College Cambridge. E. speculates that it was when invited by Headlam to help with his translation of Aeschylus that Cornford first began to meditate deeply on Aeschylus. But Headlam—one of the leading Aeschylean scholars of his day—would only have asked Cornford because he knew of his interests; presumably he discussed some difficult passages with him (Cornford’s help is not acknowledged in the translations). There is in fact evidence for cross-fertilisation of ideas that E. does not cite: in his lecture to support his bid to become Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge, Headlam ((1906) 118) illustrated the embodiment of Peitho in a human person through an example (Hdt. 6.135) that he attributed to Cornford (cf. Cornford (1907) 163–4), while in *Thucydides Mythistoricus* Cornford wrote that he owed ‘this tragic conception of Peitho, and the interpretation of the [tapestry] scene, to Dr. Headlam’ ((1907) 160 n. 2).

29–31: E. speculates that Jane Harrison inspired Cornford’s interest in Thucydides. It is true that Cornford helped read the proofs of Harrison’s *Primitive Athens*. But that work (published in 1906) is (as E. is aware) more about archaeology than Thucydides, and Cornford would have needed more time to develop and write up the ideas that became *Thucydides Mythistoricus*. E. is right to stress the general influence of Harrison (he could have noted that the work was dedicated to her), but, as with Headlam and Aeschylus, it is unsafe to draw inferences from these snippets of biographical information.

32: Cornford does not say that Herodotus is more rationalistic than Thucydides, just that the spirit of their rationalising is different. Nor does Cornford say that the older tragic interpretation is still left when Thucydides removes the fantastical: his comments on Thucydides’ rationalising of the fantastical relate to his treatment of the more distant past; the tragic interpretation, by contrast, is a survival of mythical thought that shapes Thucydides’ narrative of the more immediate past.

32: Jebb was not the first to say that Thucydides was heavily influenced by tragedy: on 39 E. notes that Jebb himself cites Ulrici’s 1833 breakdown of the *History*’s tragic structure. It was commonplace in the nineteenth century to compare Thucydides with tragedy. Nor does Jebb’s comment on the ‘immature capabilities’ of Attic Greek in Thucydides’ time indicate that Thucydides’ style is not up to the task of conveying his thoughts: Jebb was discussing the arrangement of his clauses, not his thoughts. In his article as a whole, he praised Thucydides as a ‘philosophical historian’ who wrote an ‘immortal’ work (Jebb (1907) 409, 443). This is not Cornford’s style of historicising.

34: the quotes offered from Cornford do not refer to the Pausanias story but to his treatment of Aeschylean tragic structures.

34: Pausanias was Spartan regent, not king. This mistake is taken over from Cornford.

35: ‘keep Megaera *sic* open’ should be ‘keep the isthmus between Megara and Corinth open’.

38: ‘tragedy in books two through to seven’: read ‘books four through to seven’ (as rightly on p. 26).

48: Lamb’s *Clio Enthroned* is not ‘a 314-page polemical argument against Cornford’s views’ (one chapter and a few other comments are directed against Cornford; the book as a whole is a historical study of Thucydides’ style). It is worth noting that Lamb’s book was written while both he and Cornford were Fellows at Trinity College, Cambridge.
55: the essay ‘The Scholar in Public Affairs’, dated by E. to 1929 (when it was published in *The Prospects of Democracy*), was, as indicated on its first page, originally published in 1924 in a memorial volume for George Louis Beer—a fact which itself would have been worth mentioning, because it explains why Zimmern brings in Thucydides specifically for comparison with Beer.

56: Zimmern ‘must have carefully read *Mythistoricus*’: only at 123 does E. allude (as if he has mentioned it already) to a letter Zimmern sent Cornford about the work.

61: there is a contradiction between the (correct) statement that Zimmern’s essay ‘Thucydides the Imperialist’ notes Pericles’ liberal imperial ideas in the *Epitaphios* (2.40.4 being taken to refer to external relations) and the (incorrect) statement that that essay first treats Pericles’ ideals of imperialism in Pericles’ final speech. It is the connection of Nationalism and Imperialism (very much not the ‘ideals of imperialism’) that Zimmern says is introduced in the final speech.

56, 64: Zimmern did not modernise the Greeks in *The Greek Commonwealth*; the book’s central theme is the social, economic, and political differences between ancient Greece and modern western civilisation (cf. Millett (2007) for salutary warnings against misunderstanding Zimmern’s analogies).

81: quotation from Lamb’s review of Abbott: Lamb is being snooty about modern politicians, not worrying about the difficulties of justifying the relevance of a 2,500-year-old text. In addition, Abbott positions Thucydides both as a historical product and as a political analyst for all times (rather than ‘not … but’). The logic of ‘accordingly’ is unclear (Abbott’s book could not have been responding to an opinion expressed in a review of it).

88: ‘during the Peloponnesian War in the early fourth century BC’: the Peloponnesian War is misdated—or rather, E. has incoherently attempted to capture T. R. Glover’s reference to the period between Pericles and Philip.

89–91: E. prints an interesting, hitherto unpublished, letter from J. D. Maynard to Glover. He then claims that Maynard came to Thucydides through Glover, though in the letter Maynard says that he had been reading Thucydides before Glover. E. also places Maynard in Glover’s Baptist circle and claims that the English of the letter (‘e.g. “Me finds!”’) suggests that Maynard was not university-educated. But the form of address (‘Dear Glover’) points to social equality, and mention of his having heard Glover talk ‘long ago’ on Herodotus and Euripides might make one think he was a student at Cambridge. Electronic library catalogues point to one ‘J. D. Maynard, M. A.’ (i.e., a former student at Cambridge, Oxford, or Trinity College, Dublin) as a regular contributor to Quaker (not Baptist) journals; published university registers available online show that he graduated from Oxford in 1896 with a degree in Theology. ‘Me finds’ (which is the only grammatical oddity in the letter) is a jocular pseudo-archaising coinage by analogy with the expressions ‘me thinks’ and ‘me seems’ (in which ‘me’ is originally dative and the verbs impersonal).

92: E. offers two contradictory formulations of Ullrich’s compositional hypothesis, neither quite right.

96: ‘at the end of his second chapter’: ‘second’ should be ‘eighth’.

96: E. argues that Abbott’s analysis of Thucydides’ view of Athens modifies his earlier claim of Thucydides’ impartiality. But Abbott thinks that Thucydides is right to scorn
Athenian democracy (note esp. 139: ‘Probably the whole history of mankind contains no record of a more hopelessly crude, inept, and altogether contemptible polity’). On the page E. cites (147), Abbott writes that assaults on Thucydides ‘have tended to strengthen rather than shake our confidence in his impartiality’.

100: Abbott thought that Mahaffy did not like, not that he misunderstood, Thucydides’ realism (see 132–3).

101: the ‘cynical pessimist’ quotation is from a counterfactual, so not a direct judgement by Abbott.

102: E. says that Abbott’s Thucydides is ‘not Machiavellian’. But Abbott explicitly compares Thucydides and Machiavelli (164–5)—though that he sees a moral component in both thinkers doubtless makes them un-Machiavellian in one sense of that term.

110: Toynbee presents his perception of Thucydides’ contemporaneity as historically contingent, not as something common to all readers.

114: The lecture cited was delivered in 1920, not 1921.

115: it is not ‘Western Europe’, but ‘Europe’, that Toynbee thought had produced (perhaps) three civilisations, namely the Minoan, the Graeco-Roman, and modern western civilisation.

128: Toynbee does not present the Roman-Persian Wars of AD 572–628 as happening at the same moment in the cycle of civilisations as the Peloponnesian War and the World Wars of the first half of the twentieth century; if he had done, it would undermine his whole conception of the historical cycle. It is just that these wars (and the Punic Wars) had interludes of peace.

131: the audience for Powell’s lecture is said on the same page to have been ‘about two dozen’ and ‘around fifty’.

132–3: E. states that Powell thought that scholars ‘during the Victorian period’ such as Thomas Arnold and J. P. Mahaffy took Thucydides to belong to an ‘earlier archaic and violent world that had been superseded by Victorian advances’. With Arnold, the reverse is the case: in the essay ‘On the Social Progress of States’ appended to the first volume of his Thucydides commentary (published 1830: i.e., pre-Victorian), Arnold (drawing on Vico) presented Thucydides as a modern figure at the same stage of a historical cycle as Arnold himself. E. has evidently misunderstood Powell’s reference to Arnold’s ‘priggish superiority’ (which is a matter of intellectual tone). Mahaffy (who is not mentioned by Powell himself) is also misrepresented: he thought that Thucydides presented an exaggerated picture of the decline in the morals of the Greek world and that his hard and modern-seeming scepticism was not typical of the Greeks of his day. E.’s presentation of Mahaffy is generally inconsistent (see also on pp. xii and 100 above; 83–4 is better); for a fuller picture, he could have looked at Mahaffy (1880) and especially (1909) (which includes an interesting contrast of ancient and modern attitudes to imperialism, with explicit mention of the Boer War).

134 and 191 n. 5: E. is right to surmise that the scholar who made a CA address three years earlier to which Powell’s January 1936 talk alluded was Gilbert Murray: his paper (which E. was unable to locate) was published in *PCA* (1932) (the dates in Powell’s talk all assume a date of composition of 1935).
138: the statement that Powell’s essay on Thucydides was submitted for the Cromer Prize and later to the British Academy is wrong: the submission to the British Academy was for the Cromer Prize. The typescript of the Fellowship dissertation is misdated (see 12), and the handwritten supplements do not mean that it is only a working draft: the folder with the dissertation in the Churchill College Archive includes a letter with comments on the dissertation by Ernest Harrison, a Fellow at Trinity, and some of the writing on the draft is by Harrison.

145: Powell did not speak of ‘separatism’ or ‘particularism’ as principles driving imperialism: they drive resistance to imperialism.

146: Dionysius of Halicarnassus did not divide Thucydides’ speeches into those which Thucydides heard himself and those of which he received second-hand reports; he wrote that Thucydides was neither present at the Melian Dialogue nor heard of it from others (De Thuc. 41).


147: Powell did not compare the whole Melian Dialogue to a hymn, as E. claims, but just one sentence of it (5.105).

148: E. suggests that Powell’s focus on the Melian Dialogue is surprising and an anticipation of its role in later realist scholarship; it would be better to see it as predicated on the dialogue’s prominence in previous scholarship. One such instance is Zimmern’s discussion of the dialogue at the end of The Greek Commonwealth: far from diminishing the dialogue’s importance, as E. suggests, Zimmern accentuates it (cf. his earlier citation of 5.91 on p. 209, another key structural moment, itself paralleled in ‘Thucydides the Imperialist’ ((1928) 89, 91)).

148–9: only the first of the two positions attributed to Schadewaldt and Pohlenz is correct; the second contradicts what is (rightly) said of Schadewaldt earlier in the paragraph.

177 n. 8, ‘Euripides is only mentioned once in Mythistoricus’: besides 243 (the passage E. cites), Euripides is mentioned at 138–9, 168 n. 6, 187, 193 n. 2, 204, 239, and scholia to Euripides are mentioned at 196 n. 1. Three of these passages involve block quotations in the main text. 243 is the only passage mentioned in Cornford’s Index.

181 n. 9: E. claims that it is unclear if the typescript of Zimmern’s ‘Thucydides the Imperialist’ is from 1905 or 1928. If the latter, his account of Zimmern’s development would collapse. Other scholars date the typescript to around 1905. Perhaps E. means that the handwritten emendations to the typescript may date from 1928 (when the essay was published). At any rate, Zimmern had not disowned the views expressed in this essay.

188 n. 13: the Minoans were not downgraded into a ‘society’ in A Study of History: Toynbee distinguishes in that work between ‘primitive societies’ and ‘civilisations’ while frequently applying the term ‘society’ to civilisations; the Minoans are presented as a civilisation, albeit sometimes a ‘primary’ one.
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Toynbee, A. J., ed. (1924) Greek Historical Thought (London).
—— (1928) Solon and Croesus and Other Greek Essays (Oxford).
Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi tell us that Thucydides is usually credited with being the first writer in the realist tradition as well as the founding father of the international relations discipline. Michael Doyle writes, “To most scholars in international politics, to think like a Realist is to think as the philosophical historian Thucydides first thought.” Kenneth Waltz found in Thucydides an expression of his third image in which the balance of power states find themselves in largely determines their actions. Alexander the Great and the History of Globalization. The Review of Politics, Vol. 73, Issue. 4, p. 533. CrossRef. Critical Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Resonating Voices of Thucydides. International Critical Thought, Vol. 3, Issue. 1, p. 108. A literature review is a survey of scholarly knowledge on a topic. It is used to identify trends, debates, and gaps in the research. Writing the literature review shows your reader how your work relates to existing research and what new insights it will contribute. Where does the literature review go in a dissertation? The literature review usually comes near the beginning of your thesis or dissertation. After the introduction, it grounds your research in a scholarly field and leads directly to your theoretical framework or methodology. A History of Histories book. Read 48 reviews from the world's largest community for readers. This unprecedented book by one of Britain’s most admired his... Start by marking A History of Histories: Epics, Chronicles, Romances and Inquiries from Herodotus and Thucydides to the Twentieth Century as Want to Read: Want to Read saving… Want to Read. Download Citation | Thucydides in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries | This chapter outlines some key trends in twentieth- and twenty-first-century classical scholarship on Thucydides and argues that knowledge of this | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate. If someone's reading of Thucydides has not given new life to these three resolutions, then, however many grammatical rules or historical facts he may have learnt from it, he has read Thucydides in vain. She also surveys changes in historiography in the past quarter-century and considers how Thucydidean scholarship has reflected and responded to larger cultural trends. View. Show abstract. This post discusses about all the answers and solutions for Reading Passage 3. This is another intended post for candidates who have the most difficulties in finding and understanding IELTS Reading Answers. This post can simply guide you the best to figure out every Reading answer without trouble. Finding IELTS Reading answers is a step-by-step routine and I hope this post can assist you in this topic. The answer can be found in the first few lines of paragraph no. 5. The Happiness Industry describes how the project of a science of happiness has become integral to capitalism. We learn much that is interesting about how economic problems are being redefined and treated as psychological maladies.