Cultural Postmodernity in Aotearoa/New Zealand: Biculturalism, Multiculturalism and Transculturalism

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ABSTRACT

Postmodernity involves a philosophical reflection upon "modernity", its status as an historical era, its founding values and institutions, and its cultural achievements. Thus, taking inspiration from Nietzsche, in particular, postmodernity refers to the critique and "failures" of modernity- to awareness both of its limits and its legitimating grand narratives. Postmodernity can also act as a signifier for a kind of critical reflection on the notion of culture in all its modernist guises, especially as they define the complex cultural space of the nation in three related senses. First, as defining the cultural identity of the nation-state through the expressive arts ("national culture"); second, considered as a set of state policies aimed at reinventing the nation through its history ("multiculturalism", "biculturalism"); and, more recently, as a set of state policies harnessing culture and sport as future industries in the global knowledge economy. It is the second sense I want to focus on tonight. It figures in the subtitle for this lecture "Biculturalism, Multiculturalism and Transculturalism". I shall comment upon what Enrique Dussel (1998) calls the European paradigm of modernity, before examining the "cultural turn" and finally turning to the question implicit in the sub-title.

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If mankind is not to destroy itself ... it must first of all attain to a hitherto altogether unprecedented knowledge of the preconditions of culture as a scientific standard for ecumenical goals. Herein lies the tremendous task for the great spirits of the coming century (Nietzsche, 1996: 25).

Homelessness is coming to be the destiny of the world. Hence it is necessary to think that destiny in terms of the history of being. What Marx recognized in an essential and significant sense, though derived from Hegel, as the estrangement of man has its roots in the homelessness of modern man (Heidegger, 1999: 243).

What is proper to a culture is not to be identical with itself Not to not have an identity, but not to be able to identity itself, to be able to say 'me' or 'we'; to be able to take the form of a subject only in the non-identity with itself or, if you prefer, only in the difference with itself There is no culture or cultural identity without this difference with itself (Derrida, 1992: 2).
Defining Cultural Postmodernity

There will be few people surprised by the fact that the term "postmodernity" is an essentially contested concept. In the same way that many "post" concepts are contested and elicit highly charged responses, so too "postmodernity" has quickly generated theoretical friends and enemies. Most attempts to talk of "postmodernity" do so in relation to other notions, especially "modernity" and the conceptual couplet "modernism/postmodernism". In the late 1980s and 1990s there were many publications that attempted to give a genealogy and definition of the term. David Lyons (1994: vii) suggests the general outline of the changes to which the concept refers:

Postmodernity is a multi-layered concept that alerts us to a variety of major social and cultural changes taking place at the end of the twentieth century within many 'advanced' societies. Rapid technological change, involving telecommunications and computer power, shifting political concerns, the rise of social movements, especially those with a gender, green, ethnic and racial focus, are all implicated. But the question is even bigger: is modernity itself, as a socio-cultural entity, disintegrating, including the whole grand edifice of Enlightenment world-views? And is a new type of society appearing, perhaps structured around consumers and consumption rather than workers and production?

In line with Lyon's description, Zygmunt Bauman (1997) characterises modernity in the code-words "order", "beauty" and "cleanliness", and goes back to Freud who spoke of civilisation (read "modernity") in terms of "compulsion", "regulation", "suppression" and "forced renunciation". Thus, he claims: "The discontents of modernity arose from the kind of security which tolerated too little freedom in the pursuit of human happiness. The discontents of postmodernity arise from the kind of freedom of pleasure-seeking which tolerates too little individual security" (Bauman, 1997: 3).

Perry Anderson (1998), the British Marxist, in Origins of Postmodernity provides an historical account against which to view Fredric Jameson's contribution to the debate, a contribution that Anderson places among "the great intellectual monuments of Western Marxism" (1998: 71). He interprets Jameson's notion of postmodernity as "the cultural sign of a new stage in the history of the regnant mode of production" (55). In other words, "postmodernism" is the cultural logic of late, multinational capitalism and postmodernity is explained in terms of a set of structural changes of late capitalism that influenced the experience of the subject, a new subjectivity or psychic landscape signposted in terms of the loss of any active sense of history. In addition, as Anderson further explains, Jameson indicates how postmodernism entered into complicity with the market rather than being antagonistic to it and was also "tendentially global in scope". He quotes Jameson as follows: "postmodernism may be said to be the first specifically North American global style" (cited in Anderson, 1998: 64). The capture of postmodernism by Jameson, Anderson argues, set the terms of debate for subsequent thinkers in the Marxist tradition, including Alex Callinicos (1989), David Harvey (1990) and Terry Eagleton (1996). Yet Anderson (1998: vii) is concerned to suggest "some of the conditions that may have released the postmodern - not as idea, but as phenomenon". By this I take him to mean that he is describing postmodernism as a cultural phenomenon or style, one that has already been periodised and anthologised (see Anderson, 1998: 135; and Jencks' classification, 1977) rather than the philosophical idea "postmodernity". Yet I am not sure how one can divorce the two and pretend to investigate the phenomenon without raking into account the genealogy of the idea. The latter task involves an engagement with various texts by those philosophers who were instrumental in originating the concept "modernity". I mean philosophers like Kant, who defined its philosophical contours in terms of the educational metaphor of an emergence from the status of immaturity in the public use of reason, and Hegel who was first to use the concept in historical contexts. This is not to forget philosophers like Nietzsche and Heidegger, who first contemplated the critique of modernity, thus opening the conceptual space for "postmodernity".

In this lecture I shall use "postmodernity" as a term that characterises our contemporary cultural condition, although I am embracing within the "cultural" also the political and the social in a Nietzschean sense. How seriously should we take the "post" in postmodernity? Both Nietzsche and Heidegger argued that a culture must exhibit a distinctive ethos as an integral basis for both a mode
of being and the possibility of human rootedness in the world. They saw modernity as undermining residual experiences of ethos, being, and belonging - a cultural condition analysed as a form of nihilism. They looked, respectively, to health of culture based on the transvaluation of values, and the recovery of being as both an exit from the modern experience and the real possibility of creating a culture in an epoch to come. Yet postmodernity, still in its nascent state, seems less oriented to creating genuinely novel cultural possibilities, so much as assembling old elements in new patterns, deconstructing the history of Western culture, or developing a “culture of irony” to follow Rorty (1979).

At this stage, many commentators argue that there seem to be few grounds for thinking that contemporary Western culture can locate us in a space outside modernity. In this sense, it seems, all cultural possibilities have played themselves out and the notion of “postculturalism” is often referred to in descriptions of globalisation as a form of cultural homogeneity based on the commodity form, considered as an extension of an American cultural style. Some scholars have also used the notion of globalisation as a way of exploring the spatio-temporal order of complex global cultures characterised by fluidity and hybridity. For instance Shami (2000: 177) writes:

However undisciplined the term globalization might still be, there is increasing agreement as to the kinds of processes that it points to in the world. Whether interpreting alternative modernities, cultural hybridities, commodity circulation, transnational migrations, or identity politics, globalization theory largely looks to the future, attempting to prefigure the new millennium while eschewing notions of linearity, teleology, and predictability. Concomitantly, the notion of modernity has acquired remarkable fluidity, indicating that it has become plural, uneven, contested and ‘at large’ (Appadurai, 1996). Building on ideas of the past as constructed, invented, and produced, globalization presents itself as a theory of the present moment. Powerfully expressing that ‘we now live in an almost/not yet world’ (Thrift, 1996: 257), it captures the inbetweenness of a world always on the brink of newness.

Postmodernity involves a philosophical reflection upon “modernity”, its status as an historical era, its founding values and institutions, and its cultural achievements. Thus, taking inspiration from Nietzsche, in particular, postmodernity refers to the critique and “failures” of modernity - to awareness both of its limits and its legitimating grand narratives. Postmodernity can also act as a signifier for a kind of critical reflection on the notion of culture in all its modernist guises, especially as they define the complex cultural space of the nation in three related senses. First, as defining the cultural identity of the nation-state through the expressive arts (“national culture”); second, considered as a set of state policies aimed at reinventing the nation through its history (“multiculturalism”, “biculturalism”); and, more recently, as a set of state policies harnessing culture and sport as future industries in the global knowledge economy. It is the second sense I want to focus on tonight. It figures in the subtitle for this lecture “Biculturalism, Multiculturalism and Transculturalism”. I shall comment upon what Enrique Dussel (1998) calls the European paradigm of modernity, before examining the “cultural turn” and finally turning to the question implicit in the sub-ride.

**The European Paradigm of Modernity**

The negative spin on postmodernity emphasises a kind of cultural pessimism, fragmentation and dissolution, given different expression by counter-Enlightenment thinkers, and different versions of dystopia: for example, the ravages of industrialism on the environment and, by contrast, a nostalgia for the rural community; the dislocation and fragmentation of traditional societies, indigenous cultures, and the extended family; the consequences of instrumental rationality that has great efficacy but no power of self-criticism; the movements of great colonising forces associated with forms of imperialism; the seemingly endless commodification of values.

Postmodernity considered as a future-oriented project, by contrast, describes the possibility for a reconstitution of utopian thought, involving, on one influential account, a post-scarcity order,
multi-layered democratic participation, world demilitarisation, and a humanisation of technology (for example, Giddens, 1990: 164). This more positive, though not always celebratory, project also envisages the possibility of a new global order based upon a universally accepted human rights culture and the institution of the global market. Yet this project also fractures around a triumphal neoliberal free-trade, free-finance global version embraced by the likes of Francis Fukuyama, who thinks we have reached the "end of history" and models globalisation on the self-regulating individual, and an internationalist third way version, articulated by the likes of Anthony Giddens and Will Hutton, who basically believe in the new liberal world order but seek to introduce new forms of economic governance to control the international financial system (Hutton and Giddens, 2000).

Yet both dystopian and utopian versions tend to highlight the Eurocentrism at the heart of conceptions of modernity that if left unexamined can distort conceptualisations of cultural postmodernity. Enrique Dussel (1998), adopting this line of thinking, suggests that there are two opposing paradigms that characterise modernity, the Eurocentric and the planetary. The first, he suggests, describes modernity as exclusively European, developing in the Middle Ages and over time spreading to the rest of the world; the second, as he argues, "conceptualises modernity as the culture of the center of the 'world-system', of the first world-system, through the incorporation of Amerindia, and as a result of the management of this 'centrality'". Dussel goes on to explain, "In other words, European modernity is not an independent, autopoietic, self-referential system, but instead is part of a world-system: in fact, its center" (Dussel, 1998: 4).

To illustrate the first formulation, the Eurocentric paradigm of modernity, Dussel refers to Weber's classic formulation of modernity, mentioned in the first lecture, quoting from Weber's (1976) introduction to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, that extraordinary passage that points to the West's cultural specificity: "to what combination of circumstances should the fact be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value" (cited in Dussel, 1998: 3). This line of thinking suggests Europe had the unique cultural ingredients that combined in a single comprehensive unified ethos, designated by Weber as "rationalisation", to allow it to supersede all other cultures. The thought is given its ultimate philosophical expression, as Dussel notes, in Hegel's (1956) The Philosophy of History where he suggests that the Spirit of the new world is the German Spirit which aims to realise absolute Truth as unlimited self-determination. Weber (1976: 26) takes as his central problem in cultural history "to work out and to explain genetically the special peculiarity of Occidental rationalism" which for him ultimately focuses around "the rational capitalistic organization of (formally) free labour" (21). Anyone following Weber's intellectual project today might want to substitute the capitalistic organisation of knowledge for that of labour, and we might also take this as a marker for cultural postmodernity, in general, arguing that what is distinctive in this era, to put it in quasi-Marxist terms, is that knowledge, once considered part of the cultural superstructure, has become part of the economic base. Indeed, knowledge as culture has become the programme for hard-wiring the economy - a topic I will return to in the last lecture.

Following this line further, we might argue that postmodernism as the "culture" of advanced industrial society or global consumer capitalism is an extension of the American style that homogenises cultural horizons and experience through the commodity form. And yet elements within this cultural formation also show signs of resistance to dominant cultural codes and styles, especially where they are informed by poststructuralist thinking. Resistance postmodernism as an intellectual project can be considered an exploration of the margins, the borders and limits of high modernism. It is above all a central questioning of all forms of foundationalism and the absolutist and ahistorical categories and values, sustained and propagated through the symbolic unifying power of the grand narratives, by which "man", "reason", "history" and "culture" were first projected in universalist European terms. These contestatory aspects of postmodernism are something that Jameson has some difficulty including in his early analysis, although in later work he admits the possibility of a postmodernism of resistance to the dominant cultural style. Yet resistance
postmodernism is more than an internal deconstruction of modernism and its interpretation of classical reason. Not only does it challenge the overly rationalist and elitist pretensions of modernism and modernity by exposing the gender, ethnic, class and sexual biases written into its founding, legitimating "myths" or metanarratives, but it seeks a new problematic for understanding the social construction and self-constitution of individuals and collective or social subjects.

This problematic, still in its theoretical infancy, can be seen in the fact that the "philosophy of consciousness", the tradition of subject-centred reason which inaugurated modern Western philosophy, pre-figured in Descartes' *cogito* and brought to fruition by Kant, has been exhausted. Many thinkers, as diverse as Habermas and Derrida, would have us believe that this rich seam of European philosophy which in one way or another provided the foundations in epistemology in the human sciences, and in many of the institutions and practices that still pervade contemporary life, has been thoroughly worked out. At the point at which these leading thinkers believe that the "philosophy of consciousness" is exhausted, paradoxically, the liberal culture of human rights based upon this Enlightenment philosophy has transmuted itself in the space of a few hundred years into the seemingly only viable candidate for a global political culture.

Dussel's argument for two modernities, Eurocentric and planetary, provide some advance organisers for viewing the development of biculturalism as a set of state policies in Aotearoa. There is some basis for the claim that Aotearoa/New Zealand has made some progress in coming to terms with its past (mostly as a result of Maori struggles and initiatives) especially in comparison with the still entrenched institutional racism and injustice that persists against indigenous peoples of Australia. Yet as many critics have observed, *biculturalism* has often worked as a form of state ideology rather than as a set of genuine practices. This "lip-service" recently has been thrown into high relief by the ways in which neoliberalism in New Zealand, as the reigning political ideology since 1984, marginalised and structurally disadvantaged the majority of Maori, while at the same time, paradoxically, also significantly advancing the process of addressing Maori claims under the Waitangi Tribunal. *Ka Awatea* demonstrated effectively under neoliberalism that Maori became even more structurally disadvantaged, measured on any major statistical variable or index, be it in terms of rates indicating poor health, low educational achievement, prison incarceration, or comparative household income. The present Labour administration's *Closing the Gaps* policy seems to be predicated on the recognition of immediate past failures and the widening of inequalities under neoliberal governments.

Ranginui Walker (1999: 187-8) explains that the nation-state of New Zealand was comprised from the outset by two separate and antithetical cultural traditions:

> The founding cultures of the nation-state of New Zealand are derived from two disparate traditions of Maori and Pakeha. Maori belong to the tradition-oriented world of tribalism, with its emphasis on kinship, respect for ancestors, spirituality and millennial connectedness with the natural world. Pakeha, on the other hand, were the bearers of modernity, the Westminster system of government, scientific positivism, the capitalist mode of production and the monotheism of Christianity. The philosophic difference between the two cultures is encapsulated in the prophetic aphorism:

> *E kore te umu e piri ki te rino, ka whitiria e te ra ka ngahoro*

> Clay will not unite with iron, when it is dried by the sun it crumbles away

For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the relation between these two cultures - a traditional one and a culture of modernity - came to be seen officially perceived as largely a problem of *modernisation*, of making the latter more like the former. This modernisation was not just a form of "assimilation" or "integration": the logic of modernisation was taken to supersede all forms of traditionalism. Tribalism, in particular, was perceived to be inimical to the interests of the liberal State because it promoted historic "we-they" attitudes and thereby militated against the liberal conception of one language, one culture, one state. Only recently in the Western development and political theory has it even seemed a remote possibility that the enhancement of traditional ways of life might actually contribute to, rather than hinder, the "development" or "progress" of a people.
The question of postmodernity or of postmodernisation considered in relation to traditionalism has not yet been properly raised.5

There is probably no more pressing set of philosophical problems in cultural and political theory than those that fall under the umbrella of cultural difference. The question of cultural difference in the era of modernity is normally considered in abstract terms, in terms of the logic of alterity, of Otherness, but it cannot be thought in Aotearoa/New Zealand without examining the historical context of colonisation, its consequences for imperial, white-settler and indigenous cultures, and the historic struggles against the exercise of imperial power: the myriad forms of decolonisation, cultural re-assertion and self-determination. We have a reasonably clear, though contested, historical picture of the consequences of the clash between traditional cultures and cultures of modernity, and also, of the kind of historical relations that have existed between Maori and Pakeha cultures. It is the now familiar story of cultural disintegration: language death, dislocation of rural extended family structures, the decline of traditional values, urbanisation (with all that that entails), and the official relocation of male labour to work in urban factories. A radical experiment in indigenous cultural studies would be to conceive of Pakeha “culture” from the viewpoint of Maori. What does alterity and the tradition of European thought devoted to studying the Other look like from the Other’s viewpoint?

Cultural studies as biculturalism (if I can use this shorthand), for instance, might have focused, not solely on the emergence of working class identity or the development of class culture, mass culture or popular culture, as it did in Britain, but also on the power relations existing between a metropolitan “colonising” culture and indigenous cultures - from first contact, exploration and early settlement through various stages of colonisation, to the development of “dominion status”, nationhood, and participation in global economy. Such an orientation would have the distinction of being different from either Maori Studies or English Studies. Why such a notion of cultural study did not develop in the New Zealand academy is a complicated and interesting question. One aspect of the story, I would guess, would involve the history of the relations between anthropology and Maori Studies, the genealogy of the ruling conceptions of “culture” and the influence of American structural functionalism, among other things.

The notion of culture becomes central in these discussions as it does within discussions of the nation. With the adoption of an anthropological concept of culture as a set of lived practices and later, “a structure of feeling”, certain conceptual gains were made, including the recognition of class cultures which permitted political analyses of “national” culture and popular formations. Certainly, the move from the notion of culture, considered in the singular and as a synonym for “civilization”, to cultural studies provided the grounds for recognising “culture” as a more differentiated concept that no longer gains its respectability from the discipline of cultural anthropology alone.

The Cultural Turn

The famous definition Edward Tylor (1903) gives in Primitive Culture provides a definition of human culture from the viewpoint of an evolutionist interested in stages of human development. It was Franz Boas (1948: 159) who successfully displaced the notion of "race" as the major signifier of cultural difference:

Culture may be defined as the totality of the mental and physical reactions and activities that characterize the behavior of the individuals composing a social group collectively and individually, in relation to their natural environment, to other groups, to members of the group itself and of each individual to himself (cited in Sokefield, 1999: 14).

While cultural difference under Boas’ definition came to be seen less as a matter of descent and evolutionary development and rather more as a matter of acquisition, Boas’ new concept still retained a certain determinism and exhibited homogenising tendencies, treating individuals and groups as merely cultural exemplars. Yet as many scholars have pointed out the concept of culture
is itself *an implicit instrument of Othering*, epistemologically constructing the anthropologist as "subject of knowledge" and the others as its scientific objects. This epistemological problem of reflexivity has led to the observation that anthropological knowledge creates or constructs difference: it is actually produced by anthropological texts as well as being an aspect of empirical reality (Clifford and Marcus, 1986). Yet at the very moment in which the concept in anthropology is dissolving itself into a series of epistemological and ethical puzzles, the concept of culture has been advanced as a *political concept* (see Sokefield, 1999).

Williams (1981: 88) argues that it was Herder who enabled us to first talk of cultures in the plural by equating a people and nation, thus producing the notion of "national culture". It was Williams and his compatriots, Richard Haggart, and E.P. Thompson who reinterpreted the political concept of culture by reference to class, enabling the analysis of various nationalist formations and the idea of "Englishness" in a way that established British cultural studies. It was Raymond Williams who first took a "democratic" approach to the definition of culture and emphasised the modern diversity of cultural experience in which "working-class culture" could no longer be denied its own existence. Later he (Williams, 1983: 87-93) mapped the range and overlap of meanings of the word "culture": its early use as a noun of process; its metaphorical extension to human development through until the late 18th century; and its status as an independent noun for an abstract process which marks the history of its use in modern times. Williams maintained that the use of "culture" in French and German as a synonym for "civilisation" was to undergo a marked change of use in Herder, who challenged the assumption of universal history, which pictured "civilisation" or "culture" as a unilinear process leading to the high and dominant point of 18th century European culture. This was first and foremost a reassertion of the idea of the *Volksgeist*, an emphasis on national and traditional cultures, and later it became the basis for attacking the abstract rationalism and inhumanity of an emerging industrial "civilisation". After Herder, it became possible to speak of "cultures" in the plural: "the specific and variable cultures of nations and periods, but also the specific and variable cultures of social and economic groups within a nation" (Williams, 1983: 89). The dominant sense of the word as it prevails in modern social science is to be traced first to Klemm's "decisive innovation", and later following Klemm, to Tylor's usage.

In addition to these usages, Williams (1983: 90-91) also identifies a third and relatively late use of "culture" as an "independent and abstract noun, which describes the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity". He indicates that the opposition between "material" and "spiritual" that bedevilled its earlier usage, in modern terms is repeated in the disciplines: archaeology and cultural anthropology refer to *material* production whereas history and cultural studies make reference, rather, to signifying or *symbolic* systems. To his mind this confuses and conceals the central question of the relations between "material" and "symbolic" production, which he (Williams, 1981) develops in providing a socialist theory of culture.

Williams' observations are, important not only for their theoretical contributions but also because they offer a stand-point to recognise the complexity of actual usage, the problems which arise from the conflation of different senses, and the way in which the history of the word "culture" is still active, still in the making. Thus, he notes the coining of *culchah* (a class mime-word) and *culture-vulture* (American) as signs of hostility to the notion when it has been used as a basis for making claims to superior knowledge, refinement and high art; and, at the same time, he indicates how this hostility has diminished as the sociological and anthropological uses of the term (for example, in *sub-culture*) have been steadily extended.

We can add enormously to these specifically modern developments. Predating Williams, we can note Horkheimer and Adorno's (1972) influential critical, though culturally elitist, formulation of "the culture industry" - enlightenment as mass deception. We might also mention Irving Howe's (1992) liberal notion of "mass culture" and the more recent notions of "popular culture" and "consumer culture". Christopher Lasch's (1979) *The Culture of Narcissism* was one text among many that emphasised the pathological consequences of the rise of individualism that seemingly
signalled postmodernity. More recently scholars have coined the terms "information culture", "street culture", "ethnic culture", "subculture" and most recently, "global culture". What these terms variously describe is culture in its ambiguous relationship to late global capitalism. In a word, these epithets attempt to characterise aspects of what I have called cultural postmodernity, a concept that, simultaneously and paradoxically, refers to processes of differentiation (cultural difference) and homogenisation. The former refers to the increasingly complex differentiation of culture as internal to the West and also the grudging recognition of non-Western traditional and indigenous cultures, which have followed decolonisation mostly as a result of ethnic struggles against the metropolitan state. The latter set refers to the economic processes of commodification and the different consumer forms culture takes within an emerging global culture: most conspicuously, food, fashion, and tourism; most/pervasively, news, TV, movies and the new electronic media; and, most powerfully, perhaps, intellectual products, ideas and theories.

**Biculturalism, Multiculturalism and Transculturalism**

I would argue that education played a crucial role for the conscientisation of Maori. Since the late 1960s in Aotearoa/New Zealand, Pakeha (the Maori term for non-Maori) have been forced to become more and more aware of Maori political demands concerning their own self-determination, sovereignty and their rights under the Treaty of Waitangi (1840). From the early beginnings of the latest phase of Maori protest in the early 1970s, beginning, perhaps, with the activist group Nga Tamatoa, through to the Land Marches of the 1970s, the Hikoi of the 1990s, and the establishment of new pan-Maori organisations (including the Maori Congress), te kohanga reo (language nest) and kura kaupapa Maori (Maori schooling), education has played a huge role in Maori political and cultural conscientisation. It provided one of the few avenues within a white-settler society governed, in part, by forms of individual discrimination and institutional racism, for Maori to begin the process of decolonisation, as well as to educate pakeha in Maori language and culture, and thereby, to advance Maori political and cultural causes.

Ranginui Walker (1990), himself an actor in these struggles, provides an historical narrative of the Maori struggle. He has also traced the development of Maori Studies in tertiary education in Aotearoa/New Zealand (Walker, 1999) commenting upon the question of “cultural subversion” and the European project of assimilation. (Walker was employed early on in the Department of Continuing Education at the University of Auckland and later shifted to Maori Studies). He quotes from Hirini Mead, the first Maori professor of Maori Studies in New Zealand, to indicate how Maori educational philosophy grew out the necessity for an emancipatory pedagogy:

There is no real option but for knowledge managers of our universities and departments of Maori Studies to become involved in the struggle of the Maori people to survive culturally .... Liberation is the opposite of cultural death (Mead, 1983: 340, cited in Walker, 1999: 197).

It is not surprising that Maori educational politics based upon the question of cultural survival and an emancipatory pedagogy should draw so heavily upon the work of the great Brazilian educational philosopher, Paulo Freire (1972). Freire’s educational philosophy provides an easy fit with biculturalism, understood as an ideology. It is dependent upon a logic of alterity, of Otherness, that gains its force from the Hegelian dialectic (see Peters, 2000a) expressed in the slogan “self as the negation of Other”.

The Hegelian dialectic is the machinery that underlies the development of the Marxist understanding of imperialism and much of the early work of “postcolonial” thinkers such as Frantz Fanon. Yee it suffers from a number of theoretical difficulties, although I do nor deny its effectivity as a political concept, or its employment as a necessary strategy to combat colonialism and neocolonialism. First, by dividing up Aotearoa/New Zealand into two separate, discrete cultures, it implies a false homogeneity of both cultures, reifying them and thus tends to downplay the interconnections, the links, the fluid boundaries and exchanges. This homogeneity can also
(dangerously, in my view) portray a "pureness", as though the culture is an organic whole protected from "pollution" or "contamination" in coming into contact with other cultures and social formations. Second, an Hegelian definition of culture as a notion that defines itself only through the power of negation can also be reactive, asserting that both cultures are locked into a life-and-death struggle and that only one of them can "win" in the end. This oppositional logic tends to obscure relational processes and practices that have developed between the two cultures (such as migration, borrowings, hybridisations, and other socio-cultural processes). Here the example of language is a good guide: look at New Zealand English as a distinctive local version of metropolitan English, or at modern Maori with its myriad English transliterations. Third, the discrete notion of culture easily leads to a "museumification", a kind of static and unchanging nature that preserves an essential cultural unity. Fourth, this view tends to underestimate both the importance of subcultures and social movements that have the power to redefine cultures, and also fails to conceptualise the relationship between cultures and individuals in order to take account of dissent and disagreement within cultures (see Sokefield, 1999).

Others have taken issue with biculturalism as the official and historical means of reinventing the nation to come to terms with the legacy of European colonialism. Anne Maxwell (1998) for instance, suggests that the requisitioning of indigenous Maori culture for determining both land rights and education policy were based upon a European model of authentic tradition invoked in the waka narratives of tribal identity. Even though the inventors of these narratives claimed to have drawn upon Maori sources (oral accounts reworked and refined into a homogenous mythical history) some scholars, such as Te Aku Graham, argue char bicultural histories conform to a European epistemological prototype that operates as another form of liberalism based upon the assumption of a romantic model of indigenous identity, with its nineteenth century connotations of "race" theory and purity of origin. The result, some have argued, has been highly damaging to Maori society, to recognising its heterogeneity, and the "rich variety of its historical narratives" (Maxwell, 1998: 108). he major claim is that the bicultural model of history writing and education policy has been highly damaging to the representation of small tribes, Maori women and descendants of Moriori. We might also add here that it ignores the claims of Maori on newly established urban marae who cannot or do not wish to trace their whakapapa. The bicultural model of national identity, it is argued, is also inappropriate to the Polynesian community and to the more recent wave of immigrants from Asia. What is required, in this analysis, is a more heterogeneous model that would provide the basis of a multicultural education policy and a truly representative model guaranteeing equal participation of minorities in the political and cultural process.

In response to these criticisms, the champions of biculturalism suggest that the present historical model is only a phase in the democratic process aimed at the development of a truly multicultural society, but that it is first necessary to develop the structures that empower the largest minority group. Maxwell sympathetically portrays Allon Hanson's postmodern anthropology which asserts a kind of "postcultural self-fashioning", pointing to the mythical histories of pure ethnicities. She also reports on the criticisms levelled at Hanson by Ranginui Walker and Anne Salmond, who maintained that it was inappropriate for an American academic, untutored in Maori cultural history, to comment, and, at the very least, politically insensitive for him "to cast doubt on the authenticity of tribal histories at the very time the perceived accuracy of those memories was crucial in the negotiations being carried out for the restoration of Maori fishing rights" (cited in Maxwell, 1998: 200).

On this issue I side with Ranginui Walker. Yet the problem of "truth" in historical narrative or discourse is not straightforward. There has to be room for "the facts" and for establishing states of affairs in regard to historical events, but this in itself does not mean that history should be thought of necessarily or solely in terms of "truthful narratives". At the level of historical documentation or even the chronicle it is, indeed, possible to establish "the facts", as it is necessary in the Tribunal process and any legal claim for redress against the Crown. To story these facts, to cast these facts in a narrative, is an act of judgement that involves something more than inference or inductive
reasoning. When Hayden White (1978) talks of the historical text as literary artefact he means "histories gain their explanatory effect by their success in making stories out of mere chronicles" and goes on to argue that "stories in turn are made out of chronicles by an operation which I have elsewhere called 'emplotment'". By "emplotment" White means "the encodation of the facts contained in the chronicle as components of specific kinds of plot structures".

Maxwell, by contrast, turns to Lyotard and to Jonathan Lamb's work on the sublime. While I think Lyotard's (1988) notion of *le differend* is a useful means for understanding the sources of disagreement, especially between cultures, that cannot be resolved for want of a neutral meta-language, I do not think it works in the New Zealand setting, as Maori have determined that the best way forward is to pursue their historical grievances through the legal system and by reference to the Treaty of Waitangi. The underlying difficulty is not one of the model of history-writing but rather the underlying concept of *culture* we embrace. Biculturalism is a political concept rather than a cultural one. It is one of the main juridical means through which Maori can pursue self-determination, advancement, and the well-being of descendants. Mason Durie (1998: 3) suggests, "Before the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, New Zealand might well have entered the modern world as a Maori nation-state". Shorn of its Hegelian reading, biculturalism can never be surpassed in the nation-state called Aotearoa/New Zealand. So long as national sovereignty exists, biculturalism signifies the prospect of a Maori nation, defined in terms of the special relationship to the state based upon a unique and historical set of entitlements (see Durie, 1998: 228; see also Sharp, 1992). In this sense I do not see biculturalism as a stage on the way to multiculturalism, yet biculturalism by itself is unable to address wider questions of representation of non-Maori ethnicities, groups and individuals. While it helps to shape our national identity and does so by emphasising a sense of place and belonging - a place to stand - it cannot, by itself, provide us with the software for understanding or coping with the complex changes confronting us, even although it may provide, in part, a political response to economic globalisation.

Globalisation, whether capitalist, socialist or culturalist, tends to bring into question more and more the concept of a single enclosed culture bounded by the nation-state or enclosed by the closed system of ethnic solidarity. Stephen Castles (1999: 27), for instance, writes:

> The paradox is that, just as the nation-state has achieved almost universal acceptance, it appears increasingly precarious. Globalization is eroding national boundaries and breaking the nexus between territory and power. The challenge has multiple dimensions:
> 1. The emergence of global markets and transnational corporations with economic power greater than many states;
> 2. The increasing role of supranational bodies in regulation interstate relations and individual rights;
> 3. The emergence of global culture industries based on new communications techniques;
> 4. The growth in international migration since 1945 and especially since 1980.

These dimensions raise complex questions for citizenship and nationality. They also open up possibilities for considering multiculturalism and transculturalism as explanatory concepts in the New Zealand context, in addition to biculturalism. Multiculturalism and transculturalism as, perhaps, the characteristic notions of culture in postmodernity find support in Wittgenstein's view of culture as *shared practices*. It permits an understanding of culture that recognises the fluidity, interaction and hybridisation of cultures today and provides a basis for emergent notions of multicultural and global citizenship. Wolfgang Welsch (1999) draws on Wittgenstein's notion of culture, tying it firmly to the notion of transculturalism.

He [Wittgenstein] outlined an in-principle pragmatically based concept of culture, which is free of ethnic consolidation and unreasonable demands for homogeneity. According to Wittgenstein, culture is at hand whenever practices in life are shared. The basic task is not to be conceived as an understanding of foreign cultures, but as an interaction with foreignness. Understanding may be
helpful, but is never sufficient alone, it has to enhance progress in interaction. We must change the pattern from hermeneutic conceptualizations with their beloved presumption of foreignness on the one hand and the unfortunate appropriating dialectics of understanding on the other to decidedly pragmatic efforts to interact. And there is always a good chance for such interactions, because there exist at least some entanglements, intersections and transitions between the different ways of life. It is precisely this which Wittgenstein's concept of culture takes into account. Culture in Wittgenstein's sense is, by its very structure, open to new connections and to further feats of integration. To this extent, a cultural concept reformulated along Wittgenstein's lines seems to me to be particularly apt to today's conditions (Welsch, 1999: 202-3).

Others have also recognised in Wittgenstein's notion a concept of culture that challenges modern constitutionalism by criticising the underlying concept of a single unified culture (or nation), that is internally uniform and geographically separate, and emphasising, by contrast, the view of cultures "as overlapping, interactive and internally differentiated ... " (Tully, 1995: 9). Cultures overlap geographically; they are mutually defined through complex historical patterns of historical interaction, and they are continuously transformed in interaction with other cultures. Thus, James Tully (1995: 11) explains: "The identity, and so the meaning, of any culture is thus aspectival rather than essential: like many complex human phenomena, such as language and games, cultural identity changes as it is approached from different paths and a variety of aspects come into view." He goes on to argue:

As a consequence of the overlap, interaction and negotiation of cultures, the experience of cultural difference is internal to a culture. This is the most difficult aspect of the new view of culture to grasp. On the older, essentialist view, the 'other' and the experience of otherness were by definition associated with another culture ... On the aspectival view, cultural horizons change as one moves about, just like natural horizons. The experience of otherness is internal to one's own identity, which consists in being oriented in an aspectival intercultural space ... (13).

The aspectival notion of culture is a view he ascribes to Wittgenstein and he suggests that Wittgenstein's philosophy provides an alternative worldview to the one that informs modern constitutionalism. Let me end with what Tulley describes as a way of "doing philosophy and reaching mutual understanding fit for a post-imperial age of cultural diversity":

First, contrary to the imperial concept of understanding in modern constitutionalism ... it provides a way of understanding others that does not entail comprehending what they say within one's own language of redescription, for this is now seen for what it is: one heuristic description of examples among others; one interlocution among others in the dialogue of humankind. Second, it furnishes a philosophical account of the way in which exchanges of views in intercultural dialogues nurture the attitude of 'diversity awareness' by enabling the interlocutors to regard cases differently and change their way of looking at things. Finally, it is a view of how understanding occurs in the real world of overlapping, interacting and negotiated cultural diversity in which we speak, act and associate together ... Wittgenstein's philosophy explains why we must listen to the description of each member of the crew, and indeed enter the conversation ourselves, in order to find redescriptions acceptable to all which mediate the differences we wish each other to recognise (111).

Notes

1. Thus, as I indicated in the first lecture, I tend to agree with the Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo (1988: 3) when he argues:

   The 'post-' in the term 'postmodernity' indicates in fact a taking leave of modernity. In its search to free itself from the logic of development inherent in modernity- namely the idea of a critical 'overcoming' directed toward a new foundation - post-modernity seeks exactly what Nietzsche and Heidegger seek in their own peculiar 'critical' relationship with Western thought.

2. Warren (1998: 93) argues that in Nietzsche's view there are only cultural solutions to nihilism, to which politics should be subordinated. See also my "The Analytic/Continental Divide: Nietzsche, Nihilism and the Critique of Modernity" (Peters, 2001).

4. While Habermas agrees with Derrida and Foucault that reason is inescapably located in history, society, body and language, he tries to hold onto reason and the project of modernity by emphasising a paradigm of mutual understanding based upon an intersubjective self. By contrast, the radical critics of the Enlightenment, inspired by Nietzsche and Heidegger, can be understood as demanding an increasingly concrete specification of the self in all its socio-cultural complexity: temporality and finitude; corporeality (embodiedness) and spatial location (situatedness); intersubjectivity; gendered subjectivity; sexuality; libidinal forces and emotionality; cultural and ethical self-constitution; patterns of production and consumption; constitution and positioning in discourse.

5. See, in particular, Crook et al. (1992), although the emphasis is on transformations within advanced liberal societies. For a poststructuralist approach which deconstructs development, and critiques the professionalisation of development knowledge and the institutionalisation of development practices see Escobar (1995).

6. Tom Steele (1997) reminds us that British cultural studies began principally as a political educational or pedagogical project in the field of adult education. He argues that:

   Adult education has, since the nineteenth century, been a critical place of dialogue and negotiation between the forces that attempt to modernise the British state and the emergent social movements, especially that of labour or 'working-class' movement.

Steele suggests that "interdisciplinary study in adult education was an important precursor of academic British cultural studies" (2) rather than an offshoot of English and he documents the involvement of, Haggart in extramural studies at Hull (founding the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in 1962), Thompson as a tutor for WEA and later in extramural studies at Leeds, and Williams as a member of the Department of Extramural Studies at Oxford.

7. Macmillan Brown, himself, was a great perpetrator of such myths and responsible for advancing these ideas. See, for example, his novellas which are loosely based upon his anthropology.

8. On this question see my "Emancipation and Philosophies of History: Jean-François Lyotard and Cultural Difference" (Peters, 2006).

9. Maori were, perhaps, the most successful of any collective in the Western world in politically resisting neoliberal policies of privatisation through a series of High Court cases. There is ground for thinking that Maori, under the Treacy, may also provide a resistance to ongoing biogenetic commodification and protection of biodiversity.

10. Fleras & Spoonley (1999: 248) talk of "multiculturalism within a bi-national framework".

References


Aotearoa New Zealand has long enjoyed an international reputation for its harmonious management of Māori-Pākehā relations (Crothers 2007). This assessment is accurate to some extent, even if the outcome... Biculturalism narratives clearly dominate; nevertheless, the politics of both monoculturalism and multiculturalism continue to jockey for status (see Spoonley and Trlin, 2004; Liu 2005; O’ Sullivan 2006; Sibley and Liu 2007). To the extent that many Pakeha (non-Maori) New Zealanders waffle over an openly monocultural framework, yet recoil from any proposed constitutional changes lest they lose control of the national agenda, they endorse a preference for multiculturalism as the lesser of evils. The culture of New Zealand is largely inherited from British and European custom, interwoven with Māori and Polynesian tradition. An isolated Pacific Island nation, New Zealand was comparatively recently settled by humans. Initially Māori only, then bicultural with colonial and rural values, now New Zealand is a cosmopolitan culture that reflects its changing demographics, is conscious of the natural environment, and is an educated, developed Western society. More recently, New Zealand culture has been broadened by globalization and immigration from the Pacific Islands, East Asia and South Asia. The collective consciousness of Reggae in Aotearoa New Zealand all embodies the universal message of Love, Peace, and Unity under Jah. Comedy. Some people think New Zealand should be a multicultural society that officially recognises the cultures of many different peoples, not just of Māori and Pākehā. Others think that biculturalism doesn’t go far enough in supporting Māori culture and self-determination. They argue for separate Māori institutions, such as a Māori justice system or a separate Māori House of Representatives in Parliament. Multiculturalism has been described as a “salad bowl” and “cultural mosaic.” Two different and seemingly inconsistent strategies have developed through different government policies and strategies. The first focuses on interaction and communication between different cultures; this approach is also often known as interculturalism.