1. Authority, boundaries and globalization

When we talk of modernity we refer to many things, of which one is secularization and another is the use of rational, impersonal criteria to decide, allocate, adjudicate and evaluate. One sense of secularization is the application of these criteria to the religious field: modern culture does not necessarily encourage disbelief, but it is said to encourage rational belief, that is belief based on doctrine, on principles, on texts. This is one way of depicting secularization. Yet religion, for most people, is not a set of beliefs at which they arrive by reflection from first principles, but rather a symbolic system which confers identity and marks out social and ethnic and other boundaries, and whose rituals mark crucial moments in the life cycle, and in the daily, weekly and annual cycles, as well as providing powerful emotional and meta-social mechanisms for the resolution of psychological and social tension.

We see in the institutions of the Church of England an example of religion borrowing the rationality of modern democratic culture, not because its doctrine is necessarily rational, but because of its impersonal procedures: bureaucracy, an elected synod, separation of finance from religious office, and even – up to a point – equal opportunities for members of both sexes. As an institution it sits well in a secular state, yet in this secular society, the nominally dominant institutionalized church, like others in Europe, does not possess a monopoly of the ritual life of society. Where there is institutionalized religion there is usually an undercurrent or counter-current of ‘popular’ religion which takes care of the sacred outside the impersonal culture outlined above. In these counter-currents authority is embodied in persons to whom special powers are attributed: they are not Anglican
clergy or Catholic priests, but rather charismatic leaders who have sprung as if from nowhere, and who exercise the prerogatives of their office not so long as a Church recognizes (and pays) them, but so long as they retain a following. Theirs is an embodied authority. That is one manifestation among many of the deep tension in the religious life of the West and of Europe’s former colonies, between the institutional or erudite and the popular. Another version of popular religion, but without charismatic leadership, is seen in the devotion to particular saints or shrines to which supernatural powers are attributed, especially powers to heal and to dispel misfortune. On the whole such devotions do not contest institutional authority which looks on them with benign indifference, save in high profile cases of co-optation such as Lourdes and other sites of religious tourism or pilgrimage.

In an era of colonialism and globalization these issues of authority can be seen in a distinctive light. If we allow that ritual cycles of festivals and feasts and the symbolic representation of the forces of health and illness, good fortune and misfortune, are markers of identity and difference separating peoples, ethnic groups and primary collectivities of different kinds, and if we also allow that rituals and symbols are the outward manifestations of embodied, as distinct from impersonal authority, we can begin to see why it is that conquest and colonialism, have almost invariably been associated with religious expansion and conflict. For to establish domination it is necessary to embody power, and to do so in a form which is comprehensible to the subject people. Since conquerors have no ‘legal-rational’ grounds for legitimizing their power over the conquered, religious/symbolic methods, which confer authority on their persons (independently of a set of principles) are a useful resource for its imposition.

But what then of that contemporary form of multi-dimensional, kaleidoscopic conquest and colonization which is globalization? Unlike the empires of the past, we have here a model in which all manner of frontiers (political, economic, cultural, religious) are apparently breached and even reduced to nothing in the creation of a seamless web of market relations and of the legal and humanitarian institutions of capitalist democracy
and global rules of governance. In a globalized world of democratic capitalism, all
authority is expected to be rational and impersonal, all economic agents to be optimizing
automata, and religion a matter of private personal choice experienced in an institutional
setting governed by the same democratic principles as the state itself.

The starting point of this chapter is that this picture of public religion’s place (or non-
place) in globalization is misleading. And the reason why it is misleading is not that the
advance of this impersonal secularized culture is merely taking its time, or that it is
penetrating some parts of the world at a slower pace than others, or even that the threats it
poses to ways of life produces a flight back into ‘fundamentalism’, irredentism and
similar all-embracing loyalties. Rather the reason is that the life of ritual and symbolism
which is at the heart of popular religion is itself redrawing frontiers all the time, that
innumerable forms of popular religion are themselves active globalizers, straddling or
violating cultural, ethnic and national frontiers, and in the process are redrawing new
frontiers, because ritual or religious communities cannot exist without drawing frontiers.

Globalization is therefore by no means a process which moulds all the cultures which
meet within its dynamic into a single homogeneous whole. Indeed it is equally plausible
to claim the contrary: globalization may bring about the unpacking of local cultural
complexes, but in the process it creates multifarious local identities and criss-crossing
frontiers, so that diversity comes to rule more than ever before in local spaces, even while
similarities and links across social and spatial distances also become ever more evident.
To illustrate with examples in the religious field: although millions of Africans came
under the influence of English, Scottish and American missionaries in the 19th and 20th
centuries, that is not to say that they exchanged one religious package for another: on the
contrary, the packages themselves were reshaped, and not only in Africa (Maxwell 2006).
That is why African Christianity, re-exported to the colonial metropolis by post-colonial
migrants, is so different from any British religious institution – as witness the numerous
Caribbean Pentecostal Churches, Nigerian ‘Aladura’ Churches or branches of the
Zimbabwe Assemblies of God Africa in Britain and Ghanaian Pentecostal churches in
Religion breaks through frontiers and in the process throws up new frontiers because religions ancient and modern, monotheist, polytheist and totemic, with their apparatus of ritual practices and internal, proprietary codes, are demarcators, markers. When religion crosses frontiers or breaks through barriers, even when it does so in the most violent manner, the outcome cannot be the abolition of one set of religious beliefs and practices by another, just as attempts to promote a universal God encompassing all religions, never make headway, however tolerant and inclusive that vision may be.

Side by side with violence and economic spoliation, with slavery and enserfment and political subjugation, European colonization was also a venture in mind and cultural management. Political systems were first decimated and then moulded with elaborate internal and external mechanisms of boundary creation and maintenance. So if the phrase 'religion as globalizer' is to have any analytic force, it must be underpinned by a concept of religious conquest and encounter which involves more than massacres and the destruction of temples and idols, and by a concept of globalisation rooted in contemporary experience which, as sketched above, evokes not homogenisation but rather the redrawing, and the multiplication, of social boundaries. When the first Spanish conquistadores arrived in the Americas they could barely imagine that the beings they encountered were human at all (Abulafia 2008). It is a distinctive feature of the modern world – the world to which those very conquerors gave birth - that these rearrangements and reinventions are historicized, that is to say that the people involved, victims and perpetrators of colonialism in its many forms, are made aware that they themselves have a place in history (origins) and a location in space (roots) as do the peoples with whom they enter into alliance or confrontation, and it is this location in time and place which contributes to the make-up of identity, in sociological terms. Likewise, in the process of borrowing, imposing and appropriating rituals, taboos, healing procedures, music, through religious conquest and encounter, a 'theory' is transmitted. The transmission of the apparatus of religion is accompanied by a contest of wills to appropriate and even domesticate the powers and virtues born of the invading, and of the conquered, other, and this requires a theory, a set of interrelated foundational ideas, about who the 'others' are,
their origins and roots, where they come from and whence they derive their powers or their uniqueness, and by acquiring this concept of history, of this-worldly origins and of social causation, the victims of necessity join modernity.

2. Background

This chapter’s approach to the ritual interaction of religion and globalization starts with an understanding of how the exercise of authority varies in religious contexts and with a firm grasp of the dialectic of the erudite, or institutional, and the popular in religious life. The third distinctive element in this approach is a view of religion as, among many other things, a means of boundary maintenance. These elements interact in the religion-globalization nexus: the complementary coexistence of secularism with dominant institutional churches in Europe and Latin America is disrupted by charismatic movements and migration; inherited religious sources of authority lose ground to state intrusion (in education and healthcare for example); popular religion goes global; and religion like ethnicity creates new boundaries at an accelerated rhythm, breaching ancient frontiers of nation, culture, language and religion itself through migration, communication, conversion campaigns and political commitment.

My approach differs from that of Robertson for example – perhaps the foremost, and certainly the first, student of these matters, because it analyses globalization at the grassroots, rather than deducing social charge from broad brush characterizations of society or societies ‘as a whole’. Robertson’s work (Robertson 1992), and that of Peter Beyer (Beyer 1994), who has continued in Robertson’s theoretical footsteps, can be thought of as the first stage in the evolution of our understanding of globalization’s interaction with religion. It is based on assumptions drawn from the classical sociological tradition:

- The understanding that globalization is an extension across national boundaries of the process of modernization applied to almost all societies by mainstream
sociology since the Second World War

- The use of ‘societies’ as basic units of analysis whose boundaries coincide with those of nation states

- The assumption that religious revivals are an expression of traditional identities and a reaction against modernity, and that only within the culture and self-understanding of a modern society can there exist such a concept of tradition

This strand of writing marks the beginning of a shift away from static assumptions about modernity and tradition and the unified character of modern culture and society, and the first pioneering venture into a less parochial sociological study of religion. But there is no account of the sorts of ambiguity and mechanisms of domination and resistance which can be seen through the dialectic of popular and erudite religion, nor of the alternately devastating and highly creative changes which the clash and mutual assimilations of religious practices and rituals have wrought over the long history of colonialism and its post-colonial sequel.

The multifarious character of these forces is more evident in the next stage in the interpretation of the interaction between religion and globalization which came with the flowering of ethnohistory, notably in the work of the Comaroffs in Africa (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991), grounded in both contemporary ethnography and historical documentation, with studies of Pentecostalism in Africa, notably by Maxwell (Maxwell 2006), and in Latin America by David Martin (Martin 1990), both of whom placed it firmly in the context of its international dissemination and emphasize its modernity. Subsequently the prominence of political Islam on the world stage has inspired different models, notably that of Olivier Roy (Roy 2004) which turns the tradition-modernity contrast around by insisting on the modernity of Islamic fundamentalism, or at least of its variant in Political Islam, despite its proclaimed utopia of a restoration of the umma worldwide.
3. The concept of popular religion and the cosmopolitan movement of cultural globalization

The institutionalization of religion draws a boundary between official and popular practices, for example between the regulated procedures at a Catholic mass or Anglican service led by a qualified and certified priest from the less regulated or even unregulated rituals and festivities. These latter are equally symbolic and liminal (i.e. boundary-maintaining), including festivities at local Saint's days, pilgrimage sites, or at the Christmas season. Among contemporary highly institutionalized religions, Catholicism is distinguished by the proliferation of popular forms of celebration and worship, especially in Italy, the Iberian peninsula and Latin America. It is noticeable, at least to the casual observer, that English (not Irish!) religion, whether Catholic or Anglican, has hitherto been somewhat impoverished in this respect, though that may be changing with the growth of evangelical and charismatic forms. Yet still, even in England, the popular version, the version unregulated by the church hierarchy, is there, if only embedded in commercial life, as in the ritual of exchange at Christmas which as an annual family occasion retains at least a vestige of religiously ritual character. In Islam, especially in the Middle East, institutional religious rhythms centred on mosques and their personnel exist in tension with an infinity of curers, seers, and mystics (or sufis), and in North Africa, classically, the Islam of the interior, centred on the cult of saints, coexists with the more text-based, professionally-led Islam of the cities (Gellner 1981). In South Asia, in the twentieth century a more political divergence has developed between the doctrinally-oriented Deobandis and their less stringent BhareIvi rivals in South Asia and among South Asian Muslims in Europe. Destabilisation, which in Christianity comes from exponents of an anti-intellectual charismatic religiosity, comes in Islam from educated people producing unregulated readings of sacred texts. The crisis of authority, deeper and more pervasive than in Christianity, has many causes, but this globalised educated dissidence is certainly one of them.

In Protestantism, evangelical (popular) tendencies have a history of breaking away, in innumerable, often fissiparous sects, while the Church of England itself is today divided between the erudite (or 'liberal') element which controls the establishment and an
increasingly vociferous evangelical movement rising from the pews of the more comfortable parishes in England, and from the dioceses of Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda. In Christianity and Judaism the institutionalised and the popular influence one another over time: the mystically inclined Chassidic Jewish sects have had enduring influence on other ultra-Orthodox tendencies and also on forms of Judaism which temporize more easily with the secular world, through their emphasis on a Jewish way of life even over and above issues of doctrine and learning; Pentecostal practices such as effusive singing, healing and speaking in tongues are gaining ground among Catholics in the form of the Charismatic Renewal, illustrating how popular forms spread and cross boundaries with little attention to the sensibilities of hierarchical or nominal authority – and the Catholic Church has a 2000-year history of co-opting or accommodating the popular within its ample purview.

In the context of contemporary globalisation, this Pentecostalism and the Charismatic Renewal together form a vast multinational charismatic movement which transcends inherited religious boundaries and bypasses the institutional-popular divide in a historically new shift. They are able to dispense with the institutional, Episcopal patronage which has in the past blessed popular Catholicism, however remotely in some instances. Globalization allows popular movements access to resources independently of hierarchies on a scale unknown hitherto, and secularization has undermined the monopoly of institutional religion and thus its ability to co-opt popular religion. The very definition of religion becomes a subject of controversy in a world where longstanding institutional apparatuses for the administration of the sacred can no longer command respect for their view of what is acceptable and what is not, while the officially secular character of many state apparatuses essentially excludes them from claiming final authority on the matter. In Europe the state, through the executive or the courts, and in the US the courts, decide on what counts as a religion when disputes arise over education, for example, or entitlement to charitable status or (in France) to the status of a religious association.
To return to Catholicism, we now relate the dialectic of the erudite and the popular within its vast and elaborate institutional edifice to the global reach of Catholic culture. The Church’s strategies in dealing with ‘the other’ – an ‘other’ which the Church successfully made into its ‘own’ - has been quite different from the corresponding experience of Protestantisms of all kinds. Papal defensiveness has prevented the Church from explaining its complicity in the oppression of the indigenous populations of the Americas, which was real, but not the whole story, while the Pope’s defence of the 16th century campaigns of destruction against indigenous religion in Latin America as ‘evangelisation’ (notably during a 2007 visit to Brazil) is disingenuously presented as if it was the whole story. For us, it is important to recognise that Syncretism persisted, and was tolerated and co-opted. As Catholicism established its institutional presence the conversion of indigenous peoples produced a vast array of festivals and local lay fraternities under whose auspices there developed cults of saints not dissimilar from those which already existed in the Iberian peninsula, while pre-existing beliefs persisted in spirits, and in supernatural entities governing peoples’ lives were incorporated into a semi-Christian cosmogony in spite of the Church’s campaigns. Attempts to convey Christian doctrine via popular depictions of animals and spirits to people who spoke little if any Spanish – save the elites – have been described as ‘a sort of semiological blind man’s buff’ in which for example the ‘communion of saints’ would become ‘the game of saints’ and the Trinity would be represented, among other attempts, as three Christs by artists trying to depict ‘three in one and one in three’ without risking misinterpretations (Saignes 1999) (p.114). This linguistic fumbling accompanied all sorts of coercion exercised by the authorities and also by the often grasping indigenous intermediaries, but eventually it settled into a pattern of inventive syncretism which endures to this day. Accounts such as these are repeated in very similar terms in studies of West Africa, such as Meyer’s Translating the Devil which describes similar hit-and-miss linguistic exchanges between German pietist missionaries and their potential converts among Ghana’s Ewe people (Meyer 1999).

Already in the 16th century dissidents within the Church claimed that if different peoples practised different religions, this was their way of worshipping the same universal God.
The greatest of all 'defenders of the Indians', the Dominican friar and Bishop Bartolomé de las Casas (1484-1566), had gone so far as to say that the indigenous Mexicans' practice of human sacrifice, far from being the work of the Devil, was their way of worshipping the same God as the Christians, and to denounce the Spanish conquerors who were massacring them in the name of Christianity as violators of God’s laws. A century later in 1648 the Mexican Church laid the basis for what was to become the most popular cult in the Americas, that of the Virgin of Guadalupe, based on the apparition of the Virgin to Juan Diego, a humble Indian, said to have taken place in 1531, in the aftermath of the Conquest of Mexico (1519-21). The core of the story of the vision is twofold: that the Virgin appeared not to a Bishop or priest or to a Spaniard, but to an unlettered Indian, and that the same Indian was able to show convincing evidence of a miracle to the sceptical Archbishop of Mexico (Brading 2001). The Indian overcame the Spaniard and the illiterate overcame the educated, in a story which has several hallmarks of a myth of origin: extreme brevity, the establishment of a quasi-kinship relationship between a human and a divine being, and both the contestation and the confirmation of a politico-religious institution. This is the founding myth of the Mexican Church – one of the most thriving in the world in terms of the devotion and religious participation of its followers – and of the Mexican nation.

This pattern in which boundaries are erected and then perforated - a pattern combining boundary-crossing and co-optation under elite auspices - has fed into globalisation through multiculturalism’s cult of the authentic and of course through migration. In Mexico and Peru we observe ‘neo-indian’ cults whose practitioners would not claim to be indigenous themselves but who re-enact rituals from a pre-Columbian past at sites of archaeological interest and in the forecourts of Museums and Cathedrals (Galinier and Molinié 2006). In the global migration of Africans and – more importantly – of images and idealizations of Africa, we see how post-modern projections and theories of cultural authenticity have carried local disputes into a global and mediatic arena.: for decades, in Brazil, different possession cult tendencies competed for recognition as truly African, or as representing a superior and purer version of one or another African culture. Now, in the USA, in the wake of competing African importations not from Africa but from Cuba,
Puerto Rico, Haiti and Brazil itself, cult leaders set out to discredit others by vaunting their own African purity, legitimated by sojourns in Yorubaland, but also bolstered by claims to a universalism derived, for example, from ‘the African wisdom that that gave birth not only to Egypt and Ethiopia but to human life in the Rift Valley’. (from the apologetic book by Joseph Murphy: Santería: an African religion in America, Boston, Beacon Press, 1988, quoted in (Capone 1999)). Note that in the US the claim to purity of African heritage also signals an exclusivist black identity, whereas in Latin America the racial divide is blurred, and Africa is often claimed – musically, artistically and spiritually – as a shared heritage.

We also observe how the history of Europe’s relationship with India has shaped the overseas implantation of versions of Hindu religion, but this time in social milieux far removed from the vast South Asian diasporas of Europe and North America. Wrenched from their original context of caste society, transformed by a completely new concept of a guru who is leader of a movement or organizations rather than a personal guide, the neo-Hindu cults also focus on this-worldly concerns derived from modern Western technologies of self-healing, highlighting transcendental meditation and yoga, as distinct from the focus on reincarnation and karma in South Asian religious cultures. Like the apologist for Santería quoted above – they may claim a very post-Enlightenment universalism, encompassing all religions and sometimes incorporating Jesus Christ into their pantheon. Neo-Hindu gurus and their organizations are thus involved in developing a Western-style religion, albeit one with more affinity to the New Age than to the Abrahamic traditions. Yet all the while their unique selling point is their identification with a distant other and a remote history in South Asia.

The interaction of religion and globalization seems to change the location of boundaries in two ways: one, which I call cosmopolitan, brings old practices to new groups in new settings – it is a variant of disembedding, of which one example is the conversion of Spanish America, already mentioned, and others are seen in the transplantation and reshaping of Eastern religions outside Asia. The other variant, which I call global,
extends and intensifies transnational links among groups similar in their practices and creates networks and sometimes even tightly knit communities of people straddling vast distances and also straddling non-religious boundaries of language, ethnicity and race, such as Pentecostals, the pietist Muslim revival movement Tablighi Jama’at and ultra-Orthodox Jewish sects and cultures. Whereas the cosmopolitan variant combines conversion with a receptiveness to other rituals, such as the indigenous, the global variant conducts conversion as a zero-sum, even confrontational affair, very hostile to the indigenous.

The implication is that we have to distinguish between the observation of similarities across boundaries and the interpretation of shifts in the boundaries themselves. It is fairly clear that the Catholic Charismatic Renewal engages in very similar practices and supernatural invocations to those of Pentecostals (Lehmann 2003), yet thus far one hardly ever hears of preachers of congregations merging or cooperating or even taking any notice of one another – although it will not be surprising if in the future this statement becomes less accurate. On the other hand, the shifts in ‘geo-political’ spheres of influence, for example in favour of the Pentecostal movement, bring about redrawings of geographic boundaries together with substantial change within those boundaries.

Different traditions, and different currents within them, attach varying importance to the thickness of boundaries. The Catholic Church has thin social boundaries, allowing intermarriage and syncretism, whereas Pentecostals, though little concerned by intermarriage, tend to be stricter on sex, decorum and alcohol. Jews and Muslims emphasize barriers to intermarriage, but different currents enforce them with varying strictness and conditions. What is clear, though, is that religion – in the sense of the word consecrated by centuries of usage in Europe - resembles ethnicity in its preoccupation with boundaries, marked out in many ways. Indeed, one of the difficulties faced by Western versions of Hindu traditions in achieving recognition is that they are so open and tolerant, making few demands on those whose frequent their centres, and thus may be regarded as providing a service more like counsellors or practitioners of alternative medicine than ministers of religion.
3. From cosmopolitan heterogeneity to global homogeneity: charismatic and fundamentalist movements arising from the traditions of the world religions.

The phrase at the head of this section has been formulated to refer principally to religious movements and cultures which create strong transnational ties of belonging and similarity while emphasizing the boundaries between their followers and their social environment. They accentuate transnational homogeneity. This can apply to Political Islam, to the innumerable evangelical and charismatic churches, sects and tendencies descended from the Protestant tradition and associated with names such as the Assemblies of God as well as with the Prosperity Gospel or Gospel of Health and Wealth, all of which build transnational organizations exhibiting varying degrees of centralization, but also to diasporic cultures such as ultra-Orthodox Judaism. They stand out as prime bearers of religious globalization because they straddle vast political, linguistic and geographic frontiers, creating transnational communities and networks of affiliation and togetherness. These movements and cultures benefit from, and take advantage of, globalization in order to strengthen or maintain boundaries and in order to run conversion campaigns. In the case of diasporic situations, where once migration led to a cutting off of migrants from their kin and their landscapes of memory, globalization has enabled religious and ethnic populations to preserve their ties through, for example, marriage, holidays, transfers of religious personnel, property investment and education, while at the same time, diasporic religious leaders look to adapt to their host environment through political connections, commercial development, or educational innovation, as observed among ultra-Orthodox Jews and Muslim ventures in institution-building.

The Pentecostal churches, although they are a movement, not a centralized international organization, exhibit an extraordinary degree of similarity of liturgy, organization, ideology and ethic in the most widely varying contexts – from Chile to China. This is counter-intuitive because religion as a cultural phenomenon is supposed to ‘fit in’ with inherited cultural traits (‘tradition’ in ‘traditional’ jargon), not to impose a unified model worldwide. The unity of the model is the product of a century of experimentation and communication: it is observed in styles of preaching, in a common message about the
temptations of the world and salvation through submission to Jesus. But there is also local adaptation of specific features like the names of devils and dangerous spirits (Meyer 1999). Pentecostals use imagery and symbolism drawn from local cultures, especially *possession cults*, and especially when adopting an ‘adversarial approach’ to them (Maxwell 2006) (p.57). In Brazil and West Africa this is particularly in evidence. From the late colonial period in South and South Central Africa ‘their method appealed to youth and women excluded from patriarchal ancestor religion… gave them a distinct advantage over the “rationalist” historic mission churches that refused to recognize the very real fear of witchcraft’ (*ibid.*). Where the cults deal with possession by spirits and entities who dictate a person’s life, and with elaborate esoteric cures and procedures to summon or dispel spirits of varying kinds, the Pentecostal preachers will conduct procedures to deliver people from these same spirits, and from the diabolic influence of the purported cures offered by mediums. This is not to say that both are ‘the same’ for they are not, but it does show that these Pentecostals recognize the efficacy of those spirits, and that from spirit possession and being ‘possessed’ by the devil, or from imprecation to exorcism, is not such a long step. The difference is that the Pentecostals, like other evangelicals, call upon individuals to change their lives, to adopt a life of austerity and devotion to the church – by for example attending service daily, giving up drinking, smoking and ‘licentious living’ – whereas in possession cults the medium or sorcerer retains control of the communication between the spirits and the humans whose destiny they oversee, and requires gifts in recognition of their services.

Even in its early days, in what was then the seething frontier town of Los Angeles, Pentecostalism was a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic movement, attracting black Americans, and the Mexican, European and Asian migrants to its following. Today one of its most striking features worldwide is its cross-class appeal: the ethnographic record in Africa shows they are strong among the desperately poor (Englund 2007), among the aspiring middle classes (Meyer 1998; Garner 2000), among urban and rural populations (Maxwell 2006) and among the African diaspora in Europe. Indeed, they may simply be good at niche marketing, as in Brazil where one Church (*Déus é Amor* – ‘God is Love’) seems to target the very poor and the very elderly (Lehmann 1996). In addition to their proclaimed
thaumaturgic powers, Pentecostal preachers also are very adept at ingratiating themselves with politicians because they can reliably deliver their followers’ votes.

The culture of evangelical Christianity was carried first by missionaries from England and Scotland to Africa in the early 19th century and from the beginning this transfer was marked by continuing attempts on the part of Africans to wrest the symbols and meaning of their symbolic and ritual apparatus away from missionaries and colonial authorities: for example, impressed by the medical skills of missionaries, some Africans preferred to cast them in the role of healers – much to the dismay of missionaries who wanted them to be convinced of the truth of their message on its own merits (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). But the missionaries had, so to speak, only themselves to blame, as they propagated the Bible and its innumerable stories of visions, miracles, Virgin Birth, incarnation, the resurrection of the dead and so on. For indigenous Africans conversion also represented an upward social move and an aspiration to join the colonials’ society, yet in Southern Africa especially they found themselves barred from high office in the Church and it is not surprising therefore that in the early 20th century they established their own Christian or semi-Christian movements, either in messianic form, in which rituals and taboos from the Old Testament were incorporated (as in the South African ‘Zionist’ churches) (Sundkler 1948), or in churches inspired by Black American missionaries who had broken away from churches which discriminated against them in the United States. Preachers have used the lessons and resources from expatriates and colonial churchmen to set themselves up independently and for example, recently, to Africanize the Bible by vociferously recalling that Jesus was not a ‘white man’, and had been taken to Egypt to escape persecution by the Romans (Maxwell 2006) (p. 103). The Bible is nowadays treated as a vast storehouse of uplifting stories which are mixed-and-matched by preachers who do not need the legitimacy of an academic or theological qualification. It is a vehicle which helps the colony to ‘strike back’ and claim a commanding position in global Christianity.
The global spread of churches originating in poor and middle-income countries requires a more elaborate type of organization than Pentecostal churches’ classic grassroots approach. For example an admittedly committed source (Adams 1997) claimed that already in 1994 there were 16,000 full-time missionaries from Africa, Asia and Latin America in the US, and the Health and Wealth (or Prosperity) Gospel, which in the 1990s might have been despised as a sort of ‘Macdonalds of religious life’, now seems to be the dominant force in Pentecostal expansion. This variant combines an emphasis on witchcraft and exorcism (playing on indigenous themes of possession and healing) with the promise of a healthy and prosperous lifestyle (Gifford 2004; Gifford 2008). Among the urban poor it fills an institutional vacuum in slums where there are more churches than latrines (in Nairobi for example), or in neighbourhoods where the only rival ‘institution’ is the drugs mafia (as in Rio de Janeiro). Small churches can benefit from twinning or sponsorship arrangements with North American counterparts or link in to multinational federations which can help provide training and education in religious institutions abroad (Gifford 2008). Besides proliferating small churches, the Prosperity Gospel is also borne by large-scale centralized and multinational organizations with a multi-class appeal, which are known as neo-Pentecostal, exemplified by the Brazil-based Universal Church of the Kingdom of God www.uckg.org This organization is now present in at least Argentina, Chile, Peru, Mexico, Portugal, England, Switzerland, Mozambique, Angola and South Africa, where it reproduces exactly the same repertoire of ritual and symbolic devices – such as the red heart enclosing a white dove – across the world, so that the symbols act more like a logo. Only the names of demons change to adapt to the local language.; Africa-based or originated churches include the Ghana-based Lighthouse Chapel International and Royalhouse Chapel International, or the Church of the Embassy of God in the Ukraine, which is led by a Nigerian pastor www.godembassy.org.

Conversion-led movements

Both Islamic and Jewish fundamentalists engage in activities and campaigns to bring secularized or non-observant Jews and Muslims ‘back’ to strict observance. The largest
of the Muslim movements of this kind is Tablighi Jama’at, which counts millions of followers worldwide (Kepel 1987; Metcalf 1996) and has thrived not only in India and Pakistan but worldwide among diaspora populations. Tablighi followers are apolitical and quietist, and establish mosques and schools of their own. Little seems to be known about their organizational structure, yet they build mosques and run schools, and their male followers have a very recognizable mode of dress. Like Pentecostalism, Tabligh assigns priority to missionary and preaching activity and one could describe their spread as epidemiological – through the interstices of society by friendship, word of mouth and affinity.

Among Jews the modern pioneers of what is known as the movement of ‘return’ or ‘repentance’ are the Chassidic Lubavitch sect, also known as Chabad. Under the leadership of its charismatic and highly innovative ‘Rebbe’ Menachem Mendel Schneerson, Chabad grew from a small group on the verge of extinction in the early postwar period to one of the largest Chassidic sects and one of the most influential forces in contemporary Jewish culture. Using a formula similar to the Pentecostals, the Rebbe started a system whereby missionaries are dispatched to far-flung places, to university campuses, to communities bereft of guidance or teachers, where they are expected to become self-sufficient after two or three years. They emphasize the idea of changing one’s life, abandoning frivolity, and above all of adopting a way of life attuned to Jewishness. If the process is followed through, ‘reverts’ change jobs, renounce old friendships and may even distance themselves from their families, becoming heavily reliant on the sect. If they are young they may well be pressed to marry under the auspices of the sect and their many children will be fully socialized into the Chassidic way of life. The Lubavitch idea of bringing people ‘back’ is now widely replicated, but the sect’s worldwide network of individuals and institutions is unrivalled in its openness to Jews of all stripes (Friedman 1994; Lehmann and Siebzehner 2006).

At first sight it might appear that Tabligh and Lubavitch are quite different from Pentecostals because they operate among Muslims and Jews who are to be brought ‘back’ to their heritage, whereas Pentecostals are in the business of converting people who are
not Christian at all (Pentecostals do not regard Catholics as Christian). On the other hand, like Pentecostals, both movements operate by crossing frontiers and straddling the most varied social and cultural environments. In the case of Tabligh from India and Pakistan across Europe and North America, and in that of Chabad Everywhere from Moscow to Katmandu via Europe and the Americas. It is more or less impossible to know in any detail how their core organization works: Chabad missionaries may seem to have a close link to the headquarters in Brooklyn, New York, where they gather from around the world every year in November, but on the other hand they have to become rapidly self-sufficient. In Russia Chabad emissaries have gained control over the recognized Jewish institutions, including the Chief Rabbinate of Russia, becoming the leading force in the renaissance of Jewish life thanks to organization and also to support from some high profile businessmen. One of Chabad’s skills is the ability to obtain donations from people who are not themselves always known to be very observant.

This is more or less comparable to Pentecostals especially now that there are so many centralized, multinational neo-Pentecostal churches. In all the cases – Tabligh, Chabad, neo-Pentecostals – followers are stratified into different levels of participation, and in Chabad and neo-Pentecostals one can clearly distinguish different ‘circles’: the spinal chord of full time cadres, who are deployed by a central nucleus of authority and resources; local fulltime activists who teach, preach and listen; numerous volunteer activists who give time to the movement and are strict, true believers; regular participants who take part in religious services and celebrations; and visitors who drop in from time to time. Pentecostals too seem adept at raising funds, though primarily from their followers and sometimes from politicians, but rarely from wealthy individuals.

In all these cases we observe how leaders manage extensive resources across the world and across cultural frontiers while maintaining a unified core of ritual, of lifestyle, and of symbolism. Thus they have absorbed much of globalization and modernity even to the extent of grasping the management of logos and brand names.

4. Serious fundamentalism, messianic nationalism and Islamism
The issue of fundamentalism does, however, distinguish Chabad from Pentecostals, and within Islam, between Political Islam and those who some call neo-fundamentalists (Roy 2004). Definitions of fundamentalism usually point to an insistence on textual inerrancy as a core feature: to this should be added a personalized concept of legitimate authority in which the authority to interpret the text is deposited only with certain persons. In the case of Islam, the worldwide crisis of authority has permitted all manner of local leaders to claim to correctly interpret the text, but since they do not recognize impersonal academic-style scholarly evaluation they need a following who will accept their interpretation simply because it is theirs. Close attention to creating and thickening symbolic and social boundaries delimiting the group or following, and thus to rules of sexual behaviour, reinforce personalistic authority by predisposing followers to accept the rulings of a leader. As with Chabad, the way of life is prior to the acceptance of doctrine.

Whereas scholars reject labelling Tabligh fundamentalist, neo-fundamentalist Islamism and its cousin Political Islam surely do count as such. In both those cases organizations have established themselves as solely empowered to interpret tradition, norms, rules and texts. Sharia law is often said to be context-dependent and flexible, but nevertheless Sharia judges in the lands where Islam has been established for centuries have enjoyed respect and prestige, as have imams and mullahs, so the relatively stable social environment protected the law and religious doctrine from deeply divisive challenge. The crisis of authority brought about by massive social change in the twentieth century started with the founding of two lay organizations which gave birth to Political Islam. One of these was the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928 to promote an Islamic revival which would be able to rival and resist the West after the decline and eventual collapse of the Ottoman Empire. By now, it has spawned numerous offshoots and imitations, including the Palestinian Hamas and Al-Qaida, while remaining an influential, illegal, but non-violent but force in Egypt itself. The other was the Jama’at-Islam founded in India in 1941 by Maulana Madoodi – again an organization which has spawned
offshoots and imitations in Pakistan, where it is a political party, and elsewhere, including the Taliban (Metcalf 2002).

Fundamentalist organizations and sects in Islam speak a language which in some ways is characteristically modern and definitely global. It is modern because they reject both established but ossified authority – that is, authority operating under the aegis of a state including official sharia judges – and many customs associated by other Muslims with their religion but regarded by fundamentalists as pagan or mere cultural appendages, such as elaborate marriage ceremonies, or indeed family-arranged marriages. Neo-fundamentalists are in pursuit of what Roy calls the ‘global umma’, a utopia which is rooted in modernity, fuelled by the diaspora situation in Europe, and removed from the historic lands and cultures of Islam and their accompanying customs and traditions. Tabligh is a pietist version of this. In principle one can perhaps draw a distinction, as Roy does, between this disembedded global imaginary and the (political) Islamist movements and sects which are trying to overthrow governments in Muslim countries and elsewhere; but in practice the two overlap and interchange ideas and modes of behaviour.

The evolution of Political Islam into a global phenomenon is most shockingly illustrated by the case of the Aïn el-Heloué refugee camp in Lebanon, described in a rare grounded ethnography of a Palestinian refugee camp (Rougier 2007). The camp is home to a population originating in the expulsion of their parents and grandparents from Palestine in 1948, but its politics has evolved away from once-dominant Palestinian nationalism to global jihad. Local leaders of indistinct provenance who have been schooled in Afghanistan notably, but also elsewhere, hold violent sway over the life of what is now a town, albeit one that is not recognized as such because its inhabitants have no citizenship status. The jihadist leadership is manipulated by secularist Syria and shi’ite Iran, which may sound strange because the Syrian government is fiercely hostile to Islamism. However its hostility is to Islamism in Syria: in Lebanon and Palestine its main enemy is Al-Fatah and it deploys its efforts to prevent the creation of any independent Palestinian entity not controlled by Syria, so the global jihad is a useful ally. This also explains
Syrian and indeed Iranian support for Fatah’s enemy Hamas, which is otherwise puzzling since Hamas is Islamist and Sunni.

This is but one example: the crisis of authority in Islam, especially Sunni Islam, is repeated in the European diaspora where, for example, imported imams from Bangladesh or Pakistan are unable to communicate with young British-born Muslims, by now even children of British-born parents, who speak no Bengali or Urdu (Lewis 1994; Lewis 2004). Here globalization can work to reinforce tradition, because wives, husbands and imams can be brought across from Asia to renew social habits resistant to a Western way of life; but it also can work to undermine tradition as the movements contesting authority and proclaiming a more militant but also more global Islam, campaign among the young.

Neo-fundamentalism is more a matter, in Islam, of the control of personal morality. However, the theme of hostility to the West, to democracy and to any form of public female bodily expression has melded with Political Islam and so its influence will tend to reinforce that of the more political variant. Both are, in different places, to different degrees and at different times, beneficiaries of funding from the Saudi regime which spends vast sums of money in apparently rather indiscriminate ways, funding mosques, madrasas and schools for example in Europe, where bitterly anti-Western preaching passes unquestioned. Thus the global umma, the reform of personal life and Political Islam are overlapping, though not necessarily always mutually reinforcing, forces. Like Pentecostalism, they are all constantly evolving so that clear-cut typologies are unlikely to be valid for long.

The interaction of Islam with globalization, to use the terms elaborated above, follows both cosmopolitan and global patterns (Lehmann 1998). On the one hand globalization enables Muslim diasporas to resist the influence of Western secularism, of Western scholarship, and of Western sexual mores, because habits, norms and rituals from the homeland are not lost in the way they might have been in the days when migrants left their homelands behind and lost contact for ever. This is visible in the enclaves of North English cities and in areas of London such as Slough and the East End. Linked to distant
locations, still, perhaps misleadingly, called ‘homelands’, these are homogeneous cultural complexes stretched across the globe, holding on to traditions of dress, food, music and marriage. In contrast, the reaffirmation or revival of Islam among educated and professional Muslims is built on the doctrinally-based idea of a global umma in which national and regional cultures are erased in favour of a unified creed and lifestyle which brings together Muslims of the most varied ethnic and geographic origins – though still divisions such as that between Sunni and Shia will not be blurred.

Among ultra-Orthodox Jews we find not dissimilar patterns in terms of values and attitudes to sacred texts, but we find a very different pattern with respect to the building of institutions, a more concerted effort on the part of authority figures to adapt so as to survive, and a much more marginal political extreme. For example the Lubavitch pioneered women’s education, and other Chassidic sects and ultra-Orthodox milieux more generally have followed their lead in the creation of outreach programmes directed at secularized Jews. None of this is at the expense of softening the boundaries surrounding ultra-Orthodoxy. Liberal, Reform or Conservative variants which account for the majority of Jews in North America and the UK some are scarcely recognized by the ultra-Orthodox as Jewish at all. Since Reform and Liberal Judaism are perfectly compatible with an understanding of Hebrew and of ancient and Rabbinic texts, to place intellectual grasp ahead of adoption of the lifestyle would be to admit that ultra-Orthodoxy has grey borders and allows for half-measures, and that would be anathema.

The common core of ultra-Orthodoxy is today much more stable in Judaism than in Islam. Newcomers or returnees can rarely attain positions of great influence until the second or even third generation, and leadership is in the hands of the heirs to Rabbinic succession among Yeshiva (study centre) heads, or dynastic families drenched in tradition and surrounded by courts and bureaucracies. Despite the appearance of one-man rule in Chassidic sects, institutional (non-religious or non-Rabbinical) decisions are made by committees, in a manner which goes back to the early modern period in Poland (Hundert 2004). The leadership has adapted to the challenges of the late 20th and 21st centuries by creating an entirely new ideal of very high natality and deep disdain for the
values of the permissive society or even secular life in general. In pre-war Eastern Europe most of the followers of ultra-Orthodoxy worked for a living and only the most talented studied full-time and taught, but today there has arisen the ideal of the ‘learning society’ (Friedman 1986; Soloveitchik 1994; Stolow 2004). This is very much a global culture, densely networked across five continents: marriages are routinely contracted between people in far-flung places, young people are dispatched across the world to complete their education in missions (as in Chabad) or in Israeli seminaries; such a high birth rate and the accompanying endless round of rites of passage brings people together – if they can afford it – from across the world. To sustain this way of life leaders have become very adept at extracting funds from the state, especially but not exclusively in Israel, at political lobbying to obtain subsidies for projects like schools, low-cost housing, care homes and the like, and at fundraising among Jews of all persuasions.

This could be thought of, in a loose sort of way, as the counterpart of Islam’s diasporic networks. Ultra-Orthodoxy is an extremely efficient vote-bank, obviously in Israel but also to some extent in London and New York, just as diasporic Islamic organizations in Britain are now entering into a relationship with the state in the context of programmes of social integration and the combat against violent extremism run by the government’s Department for Communities and Local Government.

Beyond this institutionalized ultra-Orthodox Jewish culture, we have witnessed since the 1967 war a messianic nationalism within Judaism which is something quite new, because it focuses on a divine entitlement to a stretch of land enshrined in the unerring word of God in the Bible. This is contrary both to classic secular and social democratic Zionism, but also to the tradition of Rabbinic learning which has treated the sacred text for centuries as a source of law and as a basis for unending hermeneutic debate among experts, but never as a set of concrete political prescriptions to be proclaimed by novices and newly religious returnees. The movement has come to dominate the once-tame National Religious Party and to exercise very strong influence in Israel’s leading rightwing party, Likud. It is a grassroots movement which has spearheaded West Bank settlement, creating ‘facts on the ground’ which politicians are pressured, successfully, to
recognize (Sprinzak 1991). Over time the settler movement has adopted, in an allusive, unprogrammed sort of way, all sorts of ultra-Orthodox paraphernalia from certain detailed but very visible aspects of male and female dress such as egregiously visible fringes hanging out of fatigues for men or calf-length skirts and headscarves for women, mixed in with a self-consciously dishevelled dress code designed to exhibit a lack of care for the body. The movement is not easy to study but it seems to have a disproportionate number of activists who are either recent immigrants to Israel or recent returnees to strict observance, or some combination of the two, highlighting the weak connection with Israeli society and the concomitant globalism of the movement. The features in common with the global umma are worth remarking on: the movement is only incidentally implanted in a particular state context – since for these ideological settlers land is of paramount importance and the Israeli state is a mere detail, an irritant. Indeed, seeing that it does not follow religious law and that for them only the return of the Messiah will herald the foundation of a Jewish state deserving of the name, Israel as a state is barely legitimate in their eyes.

5. Conclusion

It is important, in concluding, to remind the reader that this chapter focuses on only two aspects of a vast, almost limitless, subject. A fuller treatment would require, among other things, a history of the spread of religions worldwide and of the differences between the ways Eastern and Western religions (among which I include Islam as an ‘Abrahamic faith’) have dealt with frontiers and difference, plus an account of Orthodox Christianity in Russia and the Balkans. It would also have to explain the enormous variations in Islam across Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. From the theoretical point of view, a global coverage would have to question, or at least contextualise, the social science definition of religion, indelibly marked as it is by a polarity opposing monotheism and accompanying assumptions about texts and doctrines to paganism and possession as in the African and Latin American examples used here. Would this concept help us to understand how Eastern religious strands have spread, absorbed and mutually influenced one another?
The paper has focused on two of the most prominent political concerns of our time - the politics of identity and fundamentalism. The first part of the chapter had two purposes. One was to remind readers of the need to see contemporary problems in a historical perspective, both to understand what is really new and what is a recurrence of ancient phenomena, and to understand the extent to which contemporary phenomena bear the weight of the history which precedes them, especially in the field of religion and identity which is so deeply marked by heritage and origins. Secondly, taking globalization to be a process of creating and redrawing boundaries of various kinds – political, linguistic, religious, and ethnic - it outlined the role of religion in creating, thickening and perforating social boundaries, and thus its contribution to sometimes dramatic realignments of affiliation. This analysis is based on the assumption that social boundaries often criss-cross one another – the ethnic, the religious, the national and the linguistic are not usually superimposed, and the religious in particular can change, and this is more and more evident in the contemporary context in which international migration is more multi-directional than before, and where conversion-led religious movements have acquired a qualitative and quantitative importance which has made them the agenda-setters of religious life in many parts of the Western world including Africa. In many cases religion has changed in a context of war and conquest – and although the examples given are post-1492 there could have been innumerable others from earlier periods of history. Examples from the colonial histories of Latin America and Africa contrasted two traditions which manage the relationship of the institutional to the popular in different ways: the more cosmopolitan character of Catholicism is contrasted with a Protestant tradition which is much less inclined to syncretism and to a projection of the other. Yet in both traditions the exchange of rituals and doctrines across boundaries is unending. Despite an inauspicious beginning (to say the least) Catholicism eventually found creative accommodations with indigenous cultures giving rise to a varied and institutionally differentiated presence which permeates society even today. In this process the indigenous people themselves were as much protagonists as objects, a point which comes through with even greater force in Africa, where indigenous preachers built their own churches from the early 20th century and in more recent times have brought them to
Europe and sometimes also ‘gone global’, becoming the most dynamic forces in European Protestantism – a phenomenon we described as ‘the colony strikes back’. This latter pattern we have called ‘global’ in contrast to cosmopolitan because it downplays and even abhors cultural distinctiveness – yet at the same time it is suffused with possession, exorcism and healing, which have distinct resonances with indigenous African and Afro-Brazilian cults.

After this first section with its focus on the imaginary, the second section came ‘down to earth’ with accounts of religious cultures and movements which transcend national and geographical frontiers and distances and clearly draw strength from a more material aspect of globalization – the revolution in travel and communications. It focused on fundamentalist and conversion-led (evangelical) movements because (a) they embody so much of the modernity which globalization promotes, and (b) while globalization has found much of institutionalized Christianity, especially in the institutional Protestant tradition, in a state of almost numb confusion, and Sunni Islam in a massive crisis of authority, the preachers and pastoral entrepreneurs in these movements have taken advantage of the opportunities it offers among the poor and dispossessed, among migrants, and among the disoriented Muslim youth of Western Europe, Pakistan and the Middle East, and also among an intelligentsia uneasy with issues of identity and religion. Once again, the theme of boundaries emerges, since all these movements pay careful, sometimes obsessive, attention to drawing symbolic frontiers – in the form of dress codes, language use, marriage codes – and also material frontiers in the form of rules governing the use of one’s time, the classification of employment in terms of its acceptability, the pressure to contribute financially or in kind. Ultra-Orthodox Judaism is the most elaborate example of boundary-maintenance, and although only some of its sects are evangelical in vocation, bringing secularized Jews ‘back’, they have all undergone a process of retraditionalization in the period since the Holocaust, making rules ever more stringent and using the resources of modernity to consolidate their position, with remarkable success.
Finally, we came to the most straightforward cases, namely of transnational movements, and we saw in the example of the Aïn El-Heloué refugee camp in Lebanon the extremes of several features of the religion-globalization nexus: a deracinated population – the second and third generations of Palestinians in exile; a movement with no territorial base whatsoever, but devoted to a pure politico-religious cause – the global jihad; and, tragically, the manipulations of state powers.

Modernity and globalization are changing the definition of religion itself, at least the definition which has been assumed in Western Europe, of a heritage, a culture imbued in childhood and a stable and undemanding set of arrangements governing the rites of passage but also as a set of consensual values. Maybe that was always a myth – but today claims to a possession of doctrinal religious correctness are at the centre of some of our most intractable conflicts and culture wars. This is not to blame religion – for as we have seen religion itself is a multiple concept and only the most superficial and misguided notion of agency or causality would attribute anything much to religion in general.

GUIDE TO FURTHER READING

The best way to deepen your understanding of this subject is to read in history and anthropology, since that provides a sense of social processes behind or beyond the more general or theoretical pronouncements of sociologists. The following texts will be particularly stimulating:

For a historical and anthropological account of the religious encounter between colonialism and African indigenous culture, and the subsequent interweaving of them:

For Latin American syncretism the following is a standard text, though focusing mostly on the history of ideas rather than on the cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe itself.


For studies of Pentecostalism:

Martin, D. (1990). *Tongues of Fire: the Pentecostal revolution in Latin America*. Oxford, Blackwells. (Despite the apparent concentration on Latin America, this also offers the best panoramic account of the spread of evangelical Christianity across the globe from its English 19th century origins.)


Accounts of ultra-Orthodox Judaism tend to be written in ways that are not easily approachable for outsiders, but the following are good ethnographies:


An excellent study of political Islam and religious resurgence in Islam, based on the recent history of Iran and Egypt is:


An interesting, if over-enthusiastic, presentation of the internationalisation of Cuban possession cults (*santería*) is found in:


The theoretical basis for the present chapter can be found in:


Religion and globalization. Central to Huntington’s thesis in *The Clash of Civilizations* is the assumption that the post-Cold War world would regroup into regional alliances based on religious beliefs and historical attachments to various civilizations. Identifying three prominent groupings—Western Christianity (Roman Catholicism and Protestantism), Orthodox Christianity (Russian and Greek), and Islam, with additional influences from Hinduism and Confucianism—he predicted that the progress of globalization would be severely constrained by religio-political barriers. Moreover, a comparative perspective on the significance of religion in various regions of the world could well point out the extraordinary resilience and vitality of religions in various social contexts. Undeniably, religion can still play a fundamental role in giving substance. It might lead us to conclude that modernity and religious decline may not always be coterminous in every part of the world. Thus the assumption that modernisation generates religious decline cannot be considered as a universal law. The issue of secularisation and its focus on the specific internal dynamic of the western Christendom model should be subsumed by an emergent global perspective (Robertson 1987: 31). From religious or theological perspectives, globalization calls forth religious response and interpretation. Yet religion and religions have also played important roles in bringing about and characterizing globalization. Source for information on Globalization and Religion: Encyclopedia of Religion dictionary.

Globalization and religion. Globalization refers to the historical process by which all the world’s people increasingly come to live in a single social unit. It implicates religion and religions in several ways. From religious or theological perspectives, globalization calls forth religious response and interpretation. Yet religion and religions have also played important roles in bringing about and characterizing globalization. From our perspective, globalization studies imply research that is not just limited to the most popular spheres of economic and political globalization, but also includes the study of global problems such as climatic change, cultural globalization, and so on. The discussion contributes to the development of a comparative and evolutionary framework that examines what is really new about the current global situation and what constitutes therefore collectively rational responses. The recent heightened concern with religion in globalization, and the globalization of religion, provides the opportunity to undertake historical discussion from new perspectives which overcome the normal Western view that religion is not important in Realpolitik.